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NEGOTIATING JURISDICTION: RETROCEDING STATE 
AUTHORITY OVER INDIAN COUNTRY GRANTED BY 
PUBLIC LAW 280 
Robert T. Anderson 
Abstract: This Article canvasses the jurisdictional rules applicable in American Indian 
tribal territories—“Indian country.” The focus is on a federal law passed in the 1950s, which 
granted some states a measure of jurisdiction over Indian country without tribal consent. The 
law is an aberration. Since the adoption of the Constitution, federal law preempted state 
authority over Indians in their territory. The federal law permitting some state jurisdiction, 
Public Law 280, is a relic of a policy repudiated by every President and Congress since 1970. 
States have authority to surrender, or retrocede, the authority granted by Public Law 280, but 
Indian tribal governments should be allowed to determine whether and when state 
jurisdiction should be limited or removed. 
The Public Law 280 legislation was approved by Congress in the face of strenuous 
Indian opposition and denied consent of the Indian tribes affected by the Act . . . .The 
Indian community viewed the passage of Public Law 280 as an added dimension to the 
dreaded termination policy. Since the inception of its passage the statute has been 
criticized and opposed by tribal leaders throughout the Nation. The Indians allege that 
the Act is deficient in that it failed to fund the States who assumed jurisdiction and as a 
result vacuums of law enforcement have occurred in certain Indian reservations and 
communities. They contend further that the Act has resulted in complex jurisdictional 
problems for Federal, State and tribal governments. 
S. COMM. ON THE INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., BACKGROUND REP. ON 
PUBLIC LAW 280 (Comm. Print 1975) (statement of Sen. Henry M. Jackson, Chairman). 
Senator Jackson’s statement accurately described the issues then and now. This Article 
reviews the legal history of federal-tribal-state relations in the context of Public Law 280 
jurisdiction. Washington State has recently taken progressive steps that could serve as the 
foundation for a national model to remove state jurisdiction as a tribal option. The modern 
Indian self-determination policy is not advanced by adherence to termination era experiments 
like Public Law 280. The Article concludes that federal legislation should provide for a 
tribally-driven retrocession model and makes proposals to that end. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States was founded upon the principle of the “consent of 
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the governed,”1 although this proposition has dubious validity with 
respect to Indian tribes and their citizens. Despite early respect for tribal 
sovereignty and complete independence from state jurisdiction, the 
Supreme Court recognized nearly unlimited power in Congress to 
unilaterally alter the jurisdictional arrangements in tribal territories.2 
This power over Indian tribes and their territory was exercised without 
the meaningful consent of the affected tribes, and thus is morally 
suspect.3 Nevertheless, Congress utilized its authority to assert federal 
control of criminal matters in Indian country, and later to authorize some 
state criminal and civil jurisdiction over tribes and their territories. 
In 1953, Congress passed Public Law 280 (P.L. 280),4 which required 
six states to assert jurisdiction over Indian country, and opened the door 
for other states to do the same if they wished.5 It provided no role for the 
affected tribes in state decisions to assert jurisdiction. The unilateral 
imposition of state jurisdiction has long been regarded as offensive to 
tribal governments and Indian people because the states, as opposed to 
the federal government, in many ways remain the “deadliest enemies” of 
the tribes.6 In 1963, Washington State asserted jurisdiction over Indian 
                                                     
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure 
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of 
the governed . . . .”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All political power is inherent in the people, and 
governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to 
protect and maintain individual rights.”); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (“The Constitution is based on a theory of original, and continuing, consent of the 
governed.”). 
2. Compare Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (Georgia has no jurisdiction over 
non-Indians within Cherokee Reservation), with United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 
371, 415 (1980) (“[T]ribal lands are subject to Congress’ power to control and manage the tribe’s 
affairs. But the court must also be cognizant that ‘this power to control and manage [is] not 
absolute. While extending to all appropriate measures for protecting and advancing the tribe, it [is] 
subject to limitations inhering in . . . a guardianship and to pertinent constitutional restrictions.’”). 
See also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980) (“Long ago the Court 
departed from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s view that ‘the laws of [a state] can have no force’ within 
reservation boundaries . . . . ”) (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 520). See generally COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 6.01, at 499–514 (Nell J. Newton, Robert Anderson et al. 
eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN]. The 2012 edition of COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW was released as this Article was in the final editing stages. While the page numbering has 
changed, most of the section numbers remain the same and are included here for ease of reference. 
3. For a detailed examination of these consent principles, see Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent 
to American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365 (1989), and Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal 
Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45 (2012). 
4. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588. 
5. Id. 
6. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) (“Because of the local ill feeling, the 
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country and Indian people in a complex fashion that bewilders all who 
enter the jurisdictional maze.7 This assumption of state jurisdiction 
ignores the democratic consent principle and is inconsistent with modern 
policies promoting tribal self-determination.8 The separate sovereign 
status of tribes, manifested in the commerce clause of the Constitution9 
and the foundational decisions of the Supreme Court,10 supports 
continued recognition of tribal territories as areas where tribal law is 
paramount to the exclusion of state law. However, recognizing that 
Congress and the Supreme Court have in fact frequently authorized the 
assertion of state authority, Indian tribes are positioned as supplicants to 
Congress, or the states themselves, when requesting that state 
jurisdiction over Indian country be withdrawn—or retroceded. Indeed, 
some states view their jurisdiction over Indian country as the historic 
norm when in fact it is a relatively recent development. 
This Article outlines the legal history of federal-tribal relations, 
primarily in the criminal jurisdiction context, and examines in some 
detail the congressional authorization of state jurisdiction over Indian 
country nationwide and in the Washington-specific context. It reveals 
the extreme complexity of civil and criminal jurisdiction over 
Washington’s Indian country, and describes recent progressive state 
legislation that provides tribes with a path to remove state authority, 
albeit dependent on the good will of the Governor of the state. The 
Article next reviews several options for adjusting state and tribal 
jurisdiction in the areas governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act and 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. It concludes with the 
recommendation that Congress provide a tribally-driven option for 
removing state jurisdiction over Indian country. There should be a 
process of negotiation and information sharing with the states that 
obtained this non-consensual jurisdiction, but in the end a tribal request 
for the retrocession of state jurisdiction should be between the affected 
Indian tribe and the United States. The process should provide an 
opportunity for interest-based discussions to ensure that the exercise of 
criminal and civil jurisdiction in Indian country is carried out in a way 
                                                     
people of the states where they [Indians] are found are often their deadliest enemies.”). 
7. The Supreme Court upheld this complex arrangement in Washington v. Confederated Bands 
and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). 
8. See generally COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.07, at 97–113. 
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
10. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the 
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1577–81 (1996) (describing the 
foundational principles of federal Indian law). 
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that best serves all citizens. 
Part I of this Article provides historical context for the modern 
jurisdictional rules applicable to Indian tribes and their territory. Part II 
explains the baseline criminal and civil jurisdictional rules that operate 
in Indian country. Part III outlines the manner and scope of P.L. 280’s 
jurisdictional grant to the states. Part IV reviews how Washington 
asserted jurisdiction under P.L. 280, and reveals the complex 
jurisdictional scheme. Part V details the state legislation that became 
effective in June 2012, and established a process for the elimination of 
some or all state jurisdiction upon the request of an affected Indian tribe. 
Part VI explores the legal and policy issues implicated in what is 
essentially a negotiation of federal, tribal, and state sovereignty under 
P.L. 280’s framework. It also suggests approaches to federal legislation 
to guide the process in a manner consistent with modern tribal self-
determination policy. 
I. INDIAN TRIBES ARE SOVEREIGNS RECOGNIZED UNDER 
FEDERAL LAW AND FREE OF STATE JURISDICTION 
ABSENT TRIBAL AGREEMENT OR FEDERAL LAW TO THE 
CONTRARY 
The Indian Commerce Clause was included in the Constitution to 
center authority over Indian affairs in Congress and to deny state 
jurisdiction within Indian country absent some delegation from Congress 
or common law rule. In Worcester v. Georgia,11 the Court rejected 
Georgia’s assertion of criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian present 
within the Cherokee Nation without a license required by state law.12 
Chief Justice Marshall explained that Indian tribes were quasi-
independent sovereigns not subject to state jurisdiction.13 Now, Indian 
tribes, the federal government, and the states share authority within 
Indian country as a result of treaties, federal statutes, and federal 
common law. The modern definition of “Indian country,” found in the 
federal criminal code, encompasses Indian reservations, allotments, and 
                                                     
11. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
12. Id. at 559–61; see generally COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.01[2], at 501–03. 
13. “The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with 
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force.” Worcester, 31 
U.S. at 559–61. Earlier, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), the Court ruled 
that the Cherokee Nation was not a foreign nation within the meaning of Article III of the 
Constitution and thus could not invoke the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to challenge 
Georgia’s laws purporting to regulate the Nation. 
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dependent Indian communities.14 The Supreme Court later ruled that this 
definition is also generally applicable in the civil context,15 though there 
are many other definitions applicable in particular situations.16 
Treaty negotiations with western tribes took place as the United States 
gained new territory from foreign nations. Property used and occupied 
by Indian nations could not be transferred except by treaties or other 
agreements ratified by Congress.17 These tribal property rights were 
based on aboriginal Indian occupancy18 and were said to be as “sacred as 
the fee simple of the whites.”19 Three hundred and sixty-seven treaties 
with Indian tribes were negotiated and ratified between 1778 and 1871.20 
The treaties furthered peaceful relations with the tribes and provided 
access to vast areas for non-Indian settlement.21 The United States 
recognized permanent reservations, and, primarily in the upper-Midwest 
and Pacific Northwest, the tribes reserved off-reservation hunting and 
fishing rights.22 However, when non-Indians wanted to settle the land 
previously “guaranteed” to the tribes by treaty, most of the “permanent” 
tribal homelands were drastically reduced in size.23 
                                                     
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006). 
15. See Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998). 
16. See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 211 F.3d 1280, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (surveying various 
definitions of “reservation”). 
17. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006). 
18. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823); see also COHEN, supra note 2, 
§ 15.04[2], at 971 (“The Court described the tribal interest in land variously, as a ‘title of 
occupancy,’ ‘right of occupancy,’ and right of possession . . . .”). The common shorthand term for 
these property rights is “aboriginal title.” See Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 
226, 233–34 (1985); Oneida Indian Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 669 n.5, 676 (1974). 
19. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835). Of course, the Supreme Court in 
1955 created a gaping hole in the fabric of aboriginal title when it held that “unrecognized Indian 
title” in southeast Alaska was not protected by the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); see Joseph Singer, 
Erasing Indian Country: The Story of Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, in INDIAN LAW 
STORIES 229 (Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011). 
20. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES 1 (1994). 
21. See, e.g., Act of June 5, 1850, ch. XVI, 9 Stat. 437 (authorizing the President “to appoint one 
or more commissioners to negotiate treaties with the several Indian tribes in the Territory of 
Oregon, for the extinguishment of their claims to lands lying west of the Cascade Mountains; and, if 
found expedient and practicable, for their removal east of said mountains; also, for obtaining their 
assent and submission to the existing laws regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes in 
the other Territories and of the United States”). 
22. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999); 
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). 
23. For example, Congress confiscated the Black Hills of South Dakota through an “agreement” 
that amounted to a taking of the tribe’s recognized title to the land in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 377–83 (1980). 
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The promise of permanent homelands also faded during the 1850s 
when the Senate ratified treaties with tribes that authorized the breakup 
of tribal lands into individual “allotments.”24 The federal retreat from the 
consent model increased when Congress ended treaty-making in 1871.25 
The policy of ending the reservation system culminated with the 
adoption of the General Allotment Act,26 which reduced the Indian land 
base from 156 million acres in 1881 to approximately forty-eight million 
acres in 1934.27 Congress returned to the public domain lands that were 
considered “surplus” to Indian needs.28 While previous reservations were 
generally under exclusive tribal ownership, the new policies allowed an 
influx of non-Indians within reservation boundaries. This resulted in a 
checkerboard pattern of land ownership within reservations and 
introduced many of today’s vexing jurisdictional problems.29 
Congress returned to earlier policies that supported protection of 
Indian land with the adoption of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in 
1934.30 The IRA “halted further allotments and extended indefinitely the 
existing periods of trust applicable to already allotted (but not yet fee-
patented) Indian lands.”31 This return to support of tribal self-
government and a secure Indian land base was short-lived, however, as 
less than twenty years later, Congress adopted a resolution calling for the 
                                                     
24. See Treaty with the Duwamish et al., art. 7, 12 Stat. 927 (1855); Treaty with the Omahas, art. 
1, 10 Stat. 1043 (1854). 
25. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006)) (“No 
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized 
as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by 
treaty . . . .”). Existing treaty rights were not impaired. Id. The United States continued to negotiate 
agreements with Indian tribes, which were then ratified by Congress. See, e.g., Winters v. United 
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (construing agreement with the tribes of the Fort Belknap Reservation). 
26. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388. The Dawes Act gave the President 
authority to divide communal tribal lands into individual parcels to be held by tribal members. 
These “allotments” were protected from taxation and could not be sold without the consent of the 
Secretary of the Interior for a period of twenty-five years. After that they were to be held in fee 
simple status. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2006). See generally COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.04, at 75–84. 
27. COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.04, at 78–79. 
28. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
29. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 
(1989); Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962); Judith V. 
Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1995). 
30. Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–79); see 
COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.05, at 86–88. 
31. Cnty. of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 
255 (1992). Today, Indian land holdings are estimated at 55.4 million acres, with approximately 
44.4 million owned by tribes and eleven million held in the form of individual allotments. COHEN, 
supra note 2, § 15.01, at 965, § 16.03[4][a], at 1048. 
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“termination” of the federal-tribal relationship with certain Indian 
tribes.32 Although the termination period quickly fell into disfavor, its 
short tenure resulted in the end of the government-to-government 
relationship between the United States and over seventy federally 
recognized Indian tribes, and transferred jurisdiction over those tribes to 
the states.33 This state control turned the historic federal-tribal 
relationship on its head and states began aggressively to assert 
jurisdiction over Indian country through laws such as P.L. 280.34 As 
such, states began to view their claims of jurisdiction as the norm and 
viewed the presence of tribal reservations as unwanted jurisdictional 
enclaves that states opposed on principle, without examining the bona 
fide interests of the tribes or the state itself.35 
The presence of substantial numbers of non-Indians within Indian 
country and their presence on non-tribal land increased the states’ 
desires to assert jurisdiction over their non-Indian citizens in Indian 
territories. Recall, however, that it was Georgia’s assertion of 
jurisdiction over a non-Indian’s presence on the Cherokee Reservation 
that resulted in the categorical rule that states lacked jurisdiction within 
Indian country.36 Changes in federal law were necessary for states to 
accomplish their end. With Indian peoples no longer physically 
separated from the non-Indian population, and their reservations now 
included within the exterior boundaries of many states, local racism and 
jurisdictional jealousy combined to increase efforts to reduce federal 
protection of tribal autonomy. Nowhere is this more true than in the 
context of criminal jurisdiction—the focus of P.L. 280. Before launching 
into the P.L. 280 issues that are the focus of this Article, a review of 
general criminal jurisdiction rules is necessary. 
                                                     
32. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953) (directing the Secretary of the Interior to recommend 
tribes for termination); see COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.06, at 95. In general, “[termination] would 
mean that Indian tribes would eventually lose any special standing they had under Federal law: the 
tax exempt status of their lands would be discontinued; Federal responsibility for their economic 
and social well-being would be repudiated; and the tribes themselves would be effectively 
dismantled.” Richard M. Nixon, Special Message to Congress on Indian Affairs (July 8, 1970), H.R. 
Doc. 91-363, at 1. But see Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (termination of 
Menominee Indian Tribe did not abrogate tribal rights to hunt and fish free of state regulation). 
33. See COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.06, at 95. 
34. See infra Part III. 
35. CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 249 
(2005). 
36. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY FROM EXCLUSIVE TRIBAL CONTROL TO AN 
INCREASED STATE ROLE IS INCONSISTENT WITH SELF-
DETERMINATION AND CONSENT PRINCIPLES 
Criminal jurisdiction in Indian country evolved from early 
acknowledgement of exclusive tribal jurisdiction over persons within 
aboriginal territories, to a gradual assertion of paramount federal 
authority over crimes involving tribal members and non-Indians. The 
federal government initially took a hands-off approach to intra-tribal 
disputes, but as the United States shifted toward assimilation, it asserted 
jurisdiction over major crimes between tribal members. Federal 
domination of criminal jurisdiction increased over time and was 
accompanied in 1968 by the reduction of tribal authority to impose 
punishments on criminal offenders in tribal court proceedings.37 While 
there are many problems with the assertion and implementation of 
federal jurisdiction and policies, most evidence points to the conclusion 
that the exercise of state jurisdiction in the criminal law arena has made 
a bad situation worse.38 Before exploring these issues more deeply, it is 
useful to set out the basic scheme governing criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian country. 
The term “Indian country” is the geographic touchstone for 
application of the Indian law jurisdictional rules.39 The modern 
definition was adopted in 1948 to take policy changes and various 
Supreme Court decisions into account.40 Prior to 1948, the definitions of 
Indian country were supplied by Congress,41 or the Supreme Court as a 
matter of common law.42 In United States v. John,43 the Court explained 
that while “earlier cases had suggested a more technical and limited 
                                                     
37. See Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709 
(2006) (giving an insightful and descriptive critique of the adverse effects of federal policies in the 
criminal justice area). Tribal sentencing authority was limited to six months in jail and a $500 fine 
per offense, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202(7), 82 Stat. 77 (1968), and now stands at one year in jail and 
a $10,000 fine, with the option to increase the penalties to three years per offense with a $15,000 
fine, provided certain conditions are met. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006). 
38. DUANE CHAMPAGNE & CAROLE GOLDBERG, CAPTURED JUSTICE: NATIVE NATIONS AND 
PUBLIC LAW 280, at 200 (2012) [hereinafter CAPTURED JUSTICE]. 
39. See generally COHEN, supra note 2, § 3.04, at 182–99. 
40. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 757 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006)). 
41. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161 § 1, 4 Stat. 729. 
42. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 649 n.18 (1978) (citing Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 
(1877)); see COHEN, supra note 2, § 3.04[2][b], at 184–88. 
43. 437 U.S. 634. 
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definition of ‘Indian country,’” it was a “more expansive scope of the 
term that was incorporated in the 1948 revision of Title 18.”44 The 
current statute defines Indian Country as: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding 
the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running 
through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian 
communities . . . and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to 
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way 
running through the same.45 
This statute’s most often applied section is that dealing with 
“reservation” Indian country. Of particular importance here, the 
reservation component expressly includes lands patented in fee simple to 
non-Indians and state rights-of-way within reservations as Indian 
country.46 The Supreme Court noted that the reason for the unified 
treatment of all land within reservations was to facilitate effective law 
enforcement by avoiding the need to determine land status on a tract-by-
tract basis to determine the bounds of federal criminal jurisdiction.47 
A.  Federal Jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country Increased as 
Indian Nations Succumbed to Federal Domination 
Congress first treaded lightly when passing criminal laws affecting 
Indians and their territory, but gradually increased federal power as the 
non-Indian population grew. The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 
made crimes by non-Indians against Indian victims federal offenses.48 
Offenses by Indians against non-Indians were generally dealt with 
through diplomatic channels in the early days of federal-tribal relations. 
In 1817, Congress adopted the first version of the Indian Country 
Crimes Act (ICCA), which made offenses by non-Indians and Indians in 
Indian territory federal offenses.49 The ICCA extends federal criminal 
laws that apply to areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as military 
bases and national parks, to Indian country.50 The ICCA has two 
                                                     
44. Id. at 649 n.18. 
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006) (emphasis added). 
46. See Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962) 
(rejecting the State of Washington’s argument that the words “notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent” extends only to land patented to an Indian). 
47. Id. at 358–59. 
48. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 34, § 5, 1 Stat. 137, 138. 
49. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, § 1, 3 Stat. 383 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006)). 
50. The geographic jurisdictional reach of the statute is set out in 18 U.S.C. § 7. The federal 
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important exceptions. First, it does not cover Indian-on-Indian crimes.51 
Second, if an Indian has first been punished for a crime under tribal law, 
he or she may not be prosecuted under the ICCA for the same offense.52 
The ICCA also incorporates state law crimes under the Assimilative 
Crimes Act (ACA)53 to fill gaps in the federal criminal code.54 Thus, if a 
crime committed in Indian country is not covered directly by the federal 
criminal code for federal enclaves, a federal prosecutor may apply state 
criminal law through the ICCA. The second source of modern criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country is the Major Crimes Act (MCA),55 which 
defines sixteen crimes as federal offenses when committed by Indians 
(whether the victims are Indian or not).56 The MCA was passed in 
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog.57 
There, the Court ruled that the federal government was barred from 
prosecuting an Indian for the murder of another tribal member because 
of the ICCA’s Indian-on-Indian exception.58 The incident had been dealt 
                                                     
crimes made applicable include most felonies and a wide variety of offenses related to the subject 
matter of federal enclaves. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 32 (destruction of aircraft); 18 U.S.C. § 2251 
(sexual exploitation of children in federal territories). 
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. Victimless crimes such as adultery also are not covered by the ICCA. 
United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 605–06 (1916); see COHEN, supra note 2, § 9.02[1][c][iii], at 
735–36 (citing and criticizing several lower court cases that have not followed Quiver). 
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. An exception for Indians who had been punished by the local law of their 
tribe was added in 1854. Act of Mar. 27,1854, § 3, 10 Stat. 270. 
53. 18 U.S.C. § 13. 
54. See Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711, 719 (1946) (assuming that the ACA was 
subsumed within the ICCA); COHEN, supra note 2, § 9.02[1][c][ii], at 734. 
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 
56. The Major Crimes Act reads: 
(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person 
any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony 
under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous 
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an 
assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or 
neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian 
country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of 
the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. (b) Any offense 
referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and punished by Federal law in 
force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and punished in 
accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in force at 
the time of such offense. 
Id. 
57. 109 U.S. 566 (1883); see SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE, AMERICAN INDIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 134–40 
(1994); COHEN, supra note 2, § 9.02[1][e] at 742. 
58. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 572. While the ICCA and the MCA provide the substantive 
law for federal prosecutions in Indian country, at the sentencing stage the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines serve as a guide to the court. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2006); see COHEN, supra note 2, 
§ 9.02[2][h], at 747–49. “The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 conditionally eliminated the death 
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with under traditional Brule Sioux law, which called for a tribal council 
meeting, family meetings with a peacemaker, and restitution in order to 
restore order to the tribal community.59 The ethnocentric non-Indian 
view was that such tribal justice systems were inadequate and western 
notions of criminal punishment should be imposed on tribes, and thus 
the MCA became law. 
In addition, some courts have held that the United States has 
jurisdiction over some general federal criminal laws within Indian 
country.60 These appellate court rulings have been criticized because 
Congress has not expressly made such offenses applicable to Indians in 
Indian country. Just as the MCA was necessary to reach specifically 
enumerated Indian-on-Indian offenses, it seems that general federal 
statutes should not apply in Indian country unless Congress has 
expressly stated its intention to do so. However, these federal appeals 
courts appear in agreement that such general crimes have a nationwide 
scope and therefore should reach into Indian country. 
B. Tribes Retain Inherent Jurisdiction over Indians 
Indian tribes have criminal jurisdiction over their own members and 
other Indians who are members of federally recognized tribes.61 Tribal 
sentencing authority, however, was severely limited by the Indian Civil 
Rights Act (ICRA), which provides that tribes may impose only a 
sentence of up to one year in jail and/or $5000 per offense.62 The Tribal 
Law and Order Act of 2010 amended this to provide that subject to 
certain federal standards, tribes may sentence an Indian defendant to up 
                                                     
penalty for Native American defendants prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act or the General 
Crimes Act, subject to the penalty being reinstated by a tribe’s governing body.” United States v. 
Gallaher, 608 F.3d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3598). 
59. See HARRING, supra note 57, at 110, 119, 141. 
60. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 387 F.3d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1513(b), which bars retaliation against a federal witness, applies to crimes committed by and 
against Indians in Indian country); United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 499 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that the federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, “is a federal criminal statute of 
nationwide applicability, and therefore applies equally to everyone everywhere within the United 
States, including Indians in Indian country”). 
61. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 210 (2004) (upholding congressional restoration of tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 331–32 
(1978) (recognizing inherent tribal jurisdiction over tribal members). 
62. Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (tribes were originally 
limited to imposing penalties of six months in jail and a $500 fine per offense) (codified as amended 
at 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006)). The 1986 amendments increased the penalties. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
§ 4217, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
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to three years in jail and impose a $5000 fine per offense.63 
Although the Supreme Court has never decided the issue,64 tribes 
retain concurrent criminal jurisdiction over Indians with the federal 
government for crimes governed by the MCA and ICCA.65 In United 
States v. Wheeler,66 the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of 
the Constitution did not bar federal prosecution for an offense after a 
tribal prosecution based on the identical conduct.67 The Court noted that 
“tribal courts are important mechanisms for protecting significant tribal 
interests. Federal pre-emption of a tribe’s jurisdiction to punish its 
members for infractions of tribal law would detract substantially from 
tribal self-government, just as federal pre-emption of state criminal 
jurisdiction would trench upon important state interests.”68 Because 
tribal powers may not be limited by implication, it seems apparent that 
concurrent tribal jurisdiction over matters covered by federal criminal 
statutes is not preempted.69 
In Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe,70 the Supreme Court ruled that 
Indian tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants 
on the ground that such jurisdiction had been divested through the tribes’ 
incorporation into the United States, various other acts of Congress, and 
the “shared assumptions” of the three branches of the federal 
government.71 Despite the lack of jurisdiction, tribal police do have 
“authority to stop and detain a non-Indian who allegedly violates state 
and tribal law while traveling on a public road within a reservation until 
                                                     
63. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234(a), 124 Stat. 2279 (relevant 
portions codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302 (a)(7), (b) (Supp. IV 2010)). Tribes are permitted to stack 
sentences for separate offenses up to a total of nine years and $15,000 in fines. Id.  
64. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n.1 (1990). 
65. Wetsit v. Stafne, 44 F.3d 823, 825 (9th Cir. 1995). 
66. 435 U.S. 313. 
67. Id.; see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (tribal prosecution for murder not subject 
to the dictates of the Bill of Rights on the ground that tribes are separate sovereigns and not arms of 
the federal government). 
68. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 332. 
69. See COHEN, supra note 2, § 2.02, at 119–20. 
70. 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
71. Id. at 210–11. For a critical analysis of the historical record relied upon by the Court, see 
Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1979). The Oliphant ruling was 
extended by the Supreme Court to bar tribal jurisdiction not only over non-Indians, but also over 
Indians who are members of other tribes. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1989). Congress reversed 
the Court’s ruling when it amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to restore the inherent criminal 
jurisdiction of all federally recognized tribes over “all Indians” in the governing tribe’s territory. 25 
U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006). 
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that person can be turned over to state authorities for charging and 
prosecution.”72 Washington State law provides for cross-deputization 
agreements, permitting tribal law enforcement officials to enforce 
applicable state law.73 Tribes may also cross-deputize state and federal 
officers under tribal laws if they wish. 
C. States Have No Jurisdiction over Criminal Matters Involving 
Indians 
State jurisdiction over Indian country is precluded by the inherent 
sovereignty of Indian nations,74 and is also preempted by the MCA and 
the ICCA.75 Similarly, states lack jurisdiction over crimes by non-
Indians when the victim is an Indian because of the same principles. On 
the other hand, by common law rule, states have jurisdiction over crimes 
committed by non-Indians against other non-Indians within Indian 
country.76 States also appear to have jurisdiction over victimless crimes 
committed by non-Indians when no federal or tribal interests are 
                                                     
72. State v. Schmuck, 121 Wash. 2d 373, 376, 850 P.2d 1332, 1333 (1993); cf. Strate v. A-1 
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 456 n.11 (1997) (“We do not here question the authority of tribal police 
to patrol roads within a reservation, including rights-of-way made part of a state highway, and to 
detain and turn over to state officers nonmembers stopped on the highway for conduct violating 
state law.”); see also State v. Eriksen (Eriksen III), 172 Wash. 2d 506, 259 P.3d 1079 (2011) 
(holding that the stop-and-detain rule does not extend to tribal police officers who stop and detain 
non-Indians on state land outside of an Indian reservation, even when the stop is based on probable 
cause occurring within reservation boundaries); Kevin Naud, Jr., Comment, Fleeing East from 
Indian Country: State v. Erickson and Tribal Inherent Sovereign Authority to Continue Cross-
Jurisdictional Fresh Pursuit, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1251, 1272–74 (2012) (discussing Eriksen III).  
73. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020 (2010). The Washington State statute provides that: 
Tribal police officers under subsection (2) of this section shall be recognized and authorized to 
act as general authority Washington peace officers. A tribal police officer recognized and 
authorized to act as a general authority Washington peace officer under this section has the 
same powers as any other general authority Washington peace officer to enforce state laws in 
Washington, including the power to make arrests for violations of state laws. 
Id. § 10.92.020(1). The second section of the statute contains provisions related to training and 
insurance requirements and concludes with a provision mandating arbitration if an affected county 
and tribe cannot reach a cross-deputization agreement after a tribal request that conforms to the 
statutory requirements. Id. § 10.92.020(2). Both tribal and state police may be certified to enforce 
federal law within Indian country. 25 U.S.C. § 2804 (2006). State officers may be so authorized 
only if the affected Indian tribe does not object. Id. § 2804(c). 
74. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); cf. Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 
(1883) (federal government had no jurisdiction to prosecute Indian for murder of another Indian 
absent affirmative grant from Congress). 
75. COHEN, supra note 2, § 9.03[1], at 754. 
76. New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 
(1896); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). 
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implicated.77 
Congress has used its power under the Indian Commerce Clause to 
authorize the exercise of state jurisdiction in haphazard fashion. Thus, 
New York,78 Iowa,79 and Kansas80 all were authorized to exercise some 
jurisdiction over Indian country in those states.81 These statutes were the 
precursors to the most sweeping authorization of state jurisdiction ever: 
Public Law 280, which was adopted in the midst of the federal 
termination era. In addition, a number of modern land claims settlement 
acts contain provisions that place criminal law enforcement authority 
largely in the hands of state authorities, while sometimes preserving 
concurrent federal and tribal jurisdiction.82 
                                                     
77. COHEN, supra note 2, § 9.03[1], at 754–55. These are crimes that do not involve an Indian 
victim, individual Indian defendant, or tribal property. 
78. Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 809, 62 Stat. 1224 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 232 (2006)) (grant of 
criminal jurisdiction over all reservations in state, but subject to savings clause excepting state 
authority over “hunting and fishing rights as guaranteed them by agreement, treaty, or custom,” and 
preempting any state fish and game licensing requirements). 
79. Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 759, 62 Stat. 1161 (grant of criminal jurisdiction over Sac and Fox 
Reservation; concurrent federal jurisdiction reserved). 
80. Act of June 8, 1940, ch. 276, 54 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3243 (2006)) 
(grant of criminal jurisdiction over all reservations, including trust and restricted allotments in 
Kansas; concurrent federal jurisdiction reserved); see Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 110 
(1993) (construing the Kansas grant as including concurrent state jurisdiction over crimes covered 
by the federal Major Crimes Act). 
81. For a discussion of these statutes and authorities construing them, see COHEN, supra note 2, 
§ 6.04, at 581–84. 
82. See, e.g., Crow Boundary Settlement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-444, 108 Stat. 4632 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1776); Wampanoag Tribal Council of Gay Head, Inc., Indian Claims 
Settlement Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-95, 101 Stat. 704 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1771) (state 
granted jurisdiction with no mention of tribal or federal jurisdiction); Mashantucket Pequot Indian 
Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 98-134, 97 Stat. 851 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751–60) (state 
granted jurisdiction with no mention of tribal or federal jurisdiction); Maine Indian Claims 
Settlement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-420, 94 Stat. 1785 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721–35) (state 
granted jurisdiction subject to exception for internal matters), construed in Penobscot Nation v. 
Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706 (1st Cir. 1999); Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 
95-395, 92 Stat. 813 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701–16) (state granted jurisdiction). 
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III.  P.L. 280 AUTHORIZED STATE CRIMINAL AND SOME CIVIL 
JURISDICTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY IN A MANNER 
INCONSISTENT WITH MODERN SELF-DETERMINATION 
POLICIES 
A. The Passage of P.L. 280 Marked a Retreat from the Policy of 
Support for Tribal Institutions Under the IRA 
After the encouragement and tangible support provided to Indian 
tribes in the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, Congress quickly lapsed 
into a policy of assimilation and eventually into a policy of selectively 
terminating the government-to-government relationship with Indian 
tribes.83 In 1953 Congress passed House Concurrent Resolution 108, 
which set a goal of removing federal jurisdiction over Indian country 
and making Indians subject to general state law as quickly as possible.84 
Congress implemented this policy by enacting statutes applicable to 
individual tribes and set out plans for effecting the termination of the 
federal-tribal relationship.85 Another prong of the termination policy 
came through P.L. 280,86 which required six states to assert criminal 
jurisdiction and some civil jurisdiction over the Indian country located 
within those states.87 In addition, Congress provided a disclaimer of any 
                                                     
83. COHEN, supra note 2, §§ 1.05–.06, at 85–97; see also WILKINSON, supra note 35, at 1–89. 
84. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong. (1953). Although this policy was eroded in the 1960s and was 
repudiated by President Nixon in 1970, Congress did not formally revoke it until 1988. 25 U.S.C. 
§ 2501(f) (“Congress repudiates and rejects House Concurrent Resolution 108 of the 83d Congress 
and any policy of unilateral termination of Federal relations with any Indian nation.”). See generally 
COHEN, supra note 2, § 1.07, at 97–113. 
85. The court in Ute Distribution Corp. v. United States, 938 F.2d 1157, 1159 n.1 (10th Cir. 
1991), observed that:  
These tribes included: the Southern Paiutes of Utah (Act of Sept. 1, 1954, ch. 1207, 68 Stat. 
1099 (repealed 1980) (formerly codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 741–760); the Alabama and Coushatta 
Indians of Texas (Act of Aug. 23, 1954, ch. 831, 68 Stat. 768 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 721–
728); sixty-one tribes and bands in western Oregon (Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 773, 68 Stat. 
724 (repealed 1977 with respect to Siletz Tribe) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 691–
708); the Klamaths of Oregon (Act of Aug. 13, 1954, ch. 732, 68 Stat. 718 (repealed 1978 with 
respect to Modoc Tribe) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 564–564x); the Menominee 
Tribe of Wisconsin (Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250 (repealed 1973) (formerly 
codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 891–902); and the mixed-blood Utes of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservations in Utah).  
Id. 
86. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1162 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2006)). 
87. Congress also provided that the Major Crimes Act and Indian Country Crimes Act would no 
longer be applicable in the six mandatory states. 18 U.S.C. § 1162. In 2010, however, Congress 
gave Indian tribes authority to request the application of those statutes by making a request to the 
Attorney General. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 221(b), 124 Stat. 2272 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(d) (Supp. I 2010)). Regulations implementing the statute can be found 
 
04 - Anderson Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012   7:36 PM 
2012] NEGOTIATING JURISDICTION 931 
 
effect on any trust property, water rights, or hunting, trapping or fishing 
rights, including tribal regulatory power over such activities.88 
Finally, Congress also included a provision authorizing other states to 
unilaterally assert criminal and/or civil jurisdiction over Indian 
country.89 The fact that this provision did not include a role for affected 
tribes in the process has long been viewed as morally and politically 
unacceptable by Indian tribes.90 President Eisenhower expressed great 
                                                     
at 28 C.F.R. § 50.25 (2012). In the preamble to the Rule, the Justice Department stated that: “As 
indicated above, the Department concludes that the United States has concurrent jurisdiction over 
General Crimes Act and Major Crimes Act violations in areas where States have assumed criminal 
jurisdiction under ‘optional’ Public Law 280.” 76 Fed. Reg. 76,037, 76,039 (Dec. 6, 2011). The 
Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in United States v. High Elk, 902 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 
1990). But see United States v. Burch, 169 F.3d 666 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that statute 
incorporating voluntary assumption component of P.L. 280 preempted federal jurisdiction under 
MCA). United States v. Johnson, No. CR80-57MV (W.D. Wash. May 13, 1980) (holding that the 
Major Crimes Act did not apply to prosecution over which Washington State assumed jurisdiction). 
The United States appealed, but withdrew its appeal before a decision on the merits. United States v. 
Johnson, No. 80-1391 (July 23, 1980). For a critical examination of the issue, see COHEN, supra 
note 2, § 6.04[3][d], at 567–68. 
88. The criminal jurisdiction disclaimer provides in full: 
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or 
personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or 
community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against 
alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such 
property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any 
regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or 
community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or 
statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation 
thereof. 
18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (2006).  
The civil jurisdiction counterpart provides: 
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or 
personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or 
community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a restriction against 
alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such 
property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute or with any 
regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in 
probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any 
interest therein. 
28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2006). 
89. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588, 590 (“The consent of the United 
States is hereby given to any other State not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or 
civil causes of action, or with respect to both, as provided for in this Act, to assume jurisdiction at 
such time and in such manner as the people of the State shall, by affirmative legislative action, 
obligate and bind the State to assumption thereof.”). 
90. Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over Reservation 
Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535, 544–46 (1975); see DAVID M. ACKERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., Background Report on Public Law 280, at 22 (94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter 
Public Law 280] (describing opposition of the Colville and Yakima Tribes of Washington because 
of “a ‘fear of inequitable treatment in the State courts and fear that extension of State law to their 
reservations would result in the loss of various rights’”); see also Washington v. Confederated 
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concern over the law’s failure to obtain tribal consent to the intrusion on 
tribal jurisdiction in his signing statement.91 Although Congress 
ultimately approved a provision in the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act that 
required a state to obtain tribal consent before adopting P.L. 280,92 seven 
states had already unilaterally asserted some measure of jurisdiction.93 
B. P.L. 280’s Grant of Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction Did Not 
Include Civil Regulatory Authority 
The primary focus of P.L. 280 was to grant states criminal jurisdiction 
over Indian country. The legislative history makes it clear that “the 
foremost concern of Congress at the time of enacting PL-280 was 
lawlessness on the reservations and the accompanying threat to Anglos 
living nearby.”94 States did not gain any authority to regulate civil 
activities in Indian country through P.L. 28095 because Congress did not 
extend the full panoply of civil regulatory powers to the states, but only 
intended to afford Indians a judicial forum to resolve disputes among 
themselves and with non-Indians.96 This principle is clear from Bryan v. 
Itasca County,97 in which the county attempted to tax non-trust property 
within a reservation under the guise that P.L. 280 granted it authority to 
do so. The Court rejected Itasca County’s argument that the grant of 
civil jurisdiction included the authority to impose taxes and regulations 
on non-trust property within Indian country.98 
This interpretation of P.L. 280 was reinforced in the landmark case of 
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.99 In Cabazon, 
California sought to regulate bingo and various poker games on 
reservations under P.L. 280’s criminal provisions. State law permitted 
                                                     
Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 489 n.33 (1979) (noting Yakima 
opposition to state jurisdiction since 1952). 
91. CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 11 (citing CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING 
TAIL FEATHERS: TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC LAW 280 (1996)). 
92. See Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Searching for an Exit: The Indian Civil Rights 
Act and Public Law 280, in THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY 247, 247 (Carpenter, Fletcher, 
Riley eds., 2012) [hereinafter Searching for an Exit]. 
93. COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.03[a], at 544–45 n.308. 
94. Public Law 280, supra note 90, at 541. 
95. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976). 
96. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 388–91. 
97. 426 U.S. 373. For a history of the litigation, see Kevin K. Washburn, How a $147 County Tax 
Notice Helped Bring Tribes More Than $200 Billion in Indian Gaming Revenue: The Story of Bryan 
v. Itasca County, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 421(Carole Goldberg et al. eds., 2011). 
98. Id. at 390. 
99. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
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bingo and other games, but only for charitable purposes and subject to 
regulations with which the tribal gaming operators refused to comply.100 
California sought to enforce these regulations by punishing these 
violators with criminal penalties.101 When determining whether 
California had jurisdiction to regulate gaming under the criminal 
provisions of P.L. 280, the Court strongly reinforced its holding in 
Bryan.102 The Court ruled that “it must be determined whether the law is 
criminal in nature, and thus fully applicable to the reservation under § 2, 
or civil in nature, and applicable only as it may be relevant to private 
civil litigation in state court.”103 California argued that because it 
imposed criminal penalties for violations of its regulations, the case 
should not be analyzed under Bryan’s (or P.L. 280’s) civil jurisdiction 
rules. The Court rejected California’s plea by drawing a distinction 
between state “criminal/prohibitory” laws and state “civil/regulatory” 
laws.104 Conduct that is actually prohibited as a matter of state law and 
policy falls on the criminal side of P.L. 280’s grant, while activity that is 
generally permitted but regulated through state laws and rules is not 
within P.L. 280’s grant of civil jurisdiction.105 The Court rejected 
California’s argument that because criminal penalties attached to the 
violation of the state regulations, it should be regarded as prohibited 
criminal conduct and thus subject to state jurisdiction under P.L. 280. 
After examining the state’s gaming laws, the majority concluded that “in 
light of the fact that California permits a substantial amount of gambling 
activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its 
state lottery, we must conclude that California regulates rather than 
prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular.”106 The Court thus 
eliminated the argument that a state could simply attach criminal 
penalties to a regulatory program to enforce the regulations pursuant to 
P.L. 280. 
The Court’s test is easy to apply in most cases.107 For example, there 
is no doubt that serious crimes such as murder, assault, robbery and the 
like all fall on the criminal/prohibitory side of the line. In some cases, 
states have explicitly classified certain offenses as civil infractions rather 
                                                     
100. Id. at 205–06. 
101. Id. 
102. See generally id. 
103. Id. at 208. 
104. Id. at 209. 
105. Id. at 209–10 (footnote omitted). 
106. Id. at 211. 
107. See generally COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.04[3][b], at 546–53. 
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than criminal offenses. This distinction was critical in an action brought 
by the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation where the Ninth 
Circuit considered Washington’s assertion of civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over activities on highways within Indian country.108 The 
court ruled that because the state legislature decriminalized the traffic 
code, those civil regulations could not be enforced through P.L. 280.109 
Because state regulatory authority is not sanctioned by P.L. 280, what 
is left is the application of state rules of decision in civil litigation.110 
While state taxation, zoning, and workers’ compensation laws are 
regulatory in nature and thus easily identified as outside of P.L. 280’s 
grant of civil jurisdiction,111 other laws have proved difficult to classify. 
For example, a dependency proceeding leading to the involuntary 
termination of parental rights was characterized by the Ninth Circuit as a 
non-regulatory procedure akin to the adjudication of a private civil 
dispute over a contract or tort claim, thus falling within P.L. 280’s 
ambit.112 But the Wisconsin Attorney General reached the opposite 
conclusion in an opinion years earlier.113 The Ninth Circuit’s ruling 
rested on the notion that a dependency proceeding is a dispute about the 
status of a private individual—a child—and that “child dependency 
proceedings are more analogous to the ‘private legal disputes’ that fall 
under a state’s Public Law 280 jurisdiction than to the regulatory 
regimes at issue in Bryan and Cabazon.”114 This reasoning ignores the 
extreme coercive consequence of a dependency adjudication, namely 
removal of a child from the custody of a parent, and the possible 
                                                     
108. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1991). 
109. Id. at 148; see also COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.04[3][b], at 549 n.346. 
110. State law is “applicable only as it may be relevant to private civil litigation in state court.” 
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208. Rules of decision can be the common law rules utilized in private tort or 
contract litigation, or the statutes that provide substantive law for the resolution of such disputes. 
111. See COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.04[3][b], at 548; cf. Gobin v. Snohomish Cnty., 304 F.3d 909 
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that county lacked zoning authority over Indian fee land within Indian 
country). 
112. Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2005). In Comenout v. Burdman, 84 Wash. 
2d 192, 525 P.2d 217 (1974), the court upheld state jurisdiction over child dependency matters 
under the 1963 statute, but it is important to note that the case was decided prior to the criminal-
prohibitory/civil-regulatory dichotomy in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976). 
113. 70 Op. Att’y Gen. Wis. 237, 241, 246–48 (1981). But see In re Commitment of Burgess, 665 
N.W.2d 124, 132 (Wis. 2003) (involuntary commitment of an individual, who is found to be a 
“sexually violent person” under chapter 980, is “civil” rather than “criminal” based on the purposes 
of the chapter to provide treatment and to protect the public). See Burgess v. Watters, 467 F.3d 676 
(7th Cir. 2006) (declining to issue habeas corpus petition despite doubts that involuntary 
commitment scheme was within P.L. 280’s jurisdictional grant). 
114. Mann, 415 F.3d at 1059. 
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termination of parental rights. Such an outcome is only possible because 
of the state’s authority to regulate domestic relations matters as a party 
to an adjudication, which is far different from a state court being 
available to adjudicate private civil matters such as voluntary adoptions, 
contract disputes, or tort claims arising out of on-reservation conduct. 
In addition, there are a number of jurisdictional matters unaffected by 
P.L. 280. First, P.L. 280 disclaims any grant of state authority to regulate 
or tax trust or restricted property, or to affect any treaty-protected rights 
including water, hunting, and fishing rights.115 The civil disclaimer also 
precludes state probate jurisdiction over trust property and any interest 
therein.116 Second, P.L. 280 does not affect the relative bounds of state 
regulatory jurisdiction under the preemption and infringement tests 
described by the Supreme Court in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker.117 Under these related doctrines, federal law often preempts 
state regulatory jurisdiction over non-members in Indian country. 
Moreover, state regulatory jurisdiction over tribal members is generally 
preempted.118 Third, issues of tribal authority over non-members on non-
Indian fee land are analyzed under the Montana line of cases, which 
establish a presumption that there is no tribal jurisdiction absent federal 
delegation, or exceptional circumstances.119 Because P.L. 280’s 
jurisdictional grant does not affect these issues, they are similarly not in 
play when a state retrocedes any or all jurisdiction it gained under P.L. 
280. 
Also unaffected by retrocession are crimes related to Indian gaming, 
which is governed by the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 
(IGRA).120 Three provisions of the IGRA govern gaming-related 
criminal activity in Indian country.121 One provision makes state 
                                                     
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (2006) (civil); 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (2006) (criminal). The full text of 
both disclaimers is quoted in note 88, supra. 
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b); 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b). 
117. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142–43 (1980) (evaluating 
preemption of state jurisdiction over non-Indian conducting business with Indian tribe by balancing 
the relative federal, tribal, and state interests in light of traditional notions of tribal independence 
from states). 
118. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985) (state taxation of Indians in 
Indian country generally preempted); see COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.03, at 520–37. Of course, as 
noted above, P.L. 280 alters these doctrines to the extent it opens the courthouse door to adjudicate 
civil causes of action in state courts and to apply state law to resolve such disputes. 
119. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); see also Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 
532 U.S. 645 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997); COHEN, supra note 2, 
§ 6.02[2], at 515–20. 
120. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2006). See generally COHEN, supra note 2, § 12, at 857–88. 
121. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166–68. 
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gambling laws applicable within Indian country as a matter of federal 
law,122 but “gambling” does not include class I or II gaming as defined 
in IGRA, or class III gaming if conducted pursuant to a tribal-state 
compact.123 However, IGRA explicitly confers authority to prosecute 
any violations of state law exclusively on the federal government, unless 
otherwise provided by a tribal-state compact.124 This provision has been 
interpreted as preempting any state criminal jurisdiction over gaming-
related matters. In Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache,125 the 
court rejected California’s argument that it retained jurisdiction to 
enforce state gaming laws in Indian country.126 
To summarize, in non-mandatory P.L. 280 states: (1) Indians are 
potentially subject to prosecution by federal authorities under the Major 
Crimes Act or Indian Country Crimes Act, by state authorities under the 
terms of a P.L. 280 assumption, and by tribal authorities under inherent 
tribal power; (2) non-Indians are subject to federal prosecution under the 
Indian Country Crimes Act, and state prosecution under the terms of a 
P.L. 280 assumption, or the common law rules permitting state 
prosecutions of non-Indian versus non-Indian crime. When considering 
state criminal jurisdiction under P.L. 280, one must remember to 
evaluate whether the particular law is simply a civil regulation dressed 
up with criminal penalties—and thus not enforceable under the 
criminal/prohibitory civil/regulatory dichotomy developed by the 
Supreme Court. If this were not difficult enough, the Supreme Court has 
permitted non-mandatory states to selectively assert jurisdiction under 
P.L. 280, which adds another level of complexity in those 
jurisdictions—such as Washington. 
                                                     
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1166(a) (“Subject to subsection (c), for purposes of Federal law, all State laws 
pertaining to the licensing, regulation, or prohibition of gambling, including but not limited to 
criminal sanctions applicable thereto, shall apply in Indian country in the same manner and to the 
same extent as such laws apply elsewhere in the State.”). 
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1166(c). Definitions of gaming classes can be found at 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6)–(8) 
(2006). Class III gaming is commonly known as casino-style gaming and is the most lucrative and 
prevalent form of gaming nationally and in Washington. 
124. “The United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of violations 
of State gambling laws that are made applicable under this section to Indian country, [unless a 
tribal-state compact provides otherwise].” 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (2006). The compacting process 
related to the allocation of state and tribal jurisdiction is governed by 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C) 
(2006). 
125. 54 F.3d 535 (9th Cir. 1994). 
126. Id. at 539–40. 
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IV. WASHINGTON’S JURISDICTIONAL SCHEME UNDER P.L. 
280 IS CONFUSING AND INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
CONSENT PARADIGM 
The rules governing federal, state, and tribal jurisdiction set out in 
Section II changed when the Washington State Legislature passed 
important legislation in 1957127 and 1963.128 The 1957 legislation 
followed the consent paradigm as it offered state jurisdiction over Indian 
country only upon request from the affected tribe. On the other hand, in 
1963, the state selectively assumed jurisdiction without regard to tribal 
wishes.129 Eleven tribes requested state jurisdiction pursuant to the 1957 
statute, although seven tribes achieved partial retrocession of state 
jurisdiction.130 
Challenges to state jurisdiction came promptly. Individuals subject to 
state prosecutions contested the validity of the state’s assertion of 
jurisdiction on constitutional grounds. In State v. Paul,131 the defendant 
                                                     
127. 1957 Wash. Sess. Laws 941, ch. 240. The operative section of that statute is carried forward 
at WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.021 (2010): 
Whenever the governor of this state shall receive from the majority of any tribe or the tribal 
council or other governing body, duly recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, of any 
Indian tribe, community, band, or group in this state a resolution expressing its desire that its 
people and lands be subject to the criminal or civil jurisdiction of the state of Washington to 
the full extent authorized by federal law, he or she shall issue within sixty days a proclamation 
to the effect that such jurisdiction shall apply to all Indians and all Indian territory, 
reservations, country, and lands of the Indian body involved to the same extent that this state 
exercises civil and criminal jurisdiction or both elsewhere within the state: PROVIDED, That 
jurisdiction assumed pursuant to this section shall nevertheless be subject to the limitations set 
forth in RCW 37.12.060. 
Id. 
128. 1963 Wash. Sess. Laws 346, ch. 36 (codified at WASH REV. CODE § 37.12.010); see also M. 
Brent Leonhard, Returning Washington P.L. 280 Jurisdiction to Its Original Consent-Based 
Grounds, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 663, 704–12 (2012) (discussing the 1957 and 1963 statutes). 
129. See infra notes 137–68 and accompanying text for details about the 1963 statute. 
130. The eleven are: Muckleshoot, Squaxin Island, Nisqually, Skokomish, Suquamish (Port 
Madison), Tulalip Tribes, Quinault Indian Nation, Confederated Tribes of the Chehalis Reservation, 
Quileute Indian Reservation, Swinomish Tribal Community, and Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Reservation. 1 NAT’L AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES ASS’N, JUSTICE AND THE AMERICAN 
INDIAN: THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC LAW 280 UPON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE ON 
INDIAN RESERVATIONS 78–81 (1974). The Swinomish and Colville requests for state jurisdiction 
were made after 1963, and thus under that statute, which carried forward most of the voluntary 
consent provisions of the 1957 statute. See Colville Business Council Res. 1965-4 (Jan. 13, 1965) 
(full jurisdiction, except fish and game regulation) (on file with Washington Law Review); 
Swinomish Indian S. Res. (Mar. 23, 1963) (criminal jurisdiction only) (on file with Washington 
Law Review). The 1963 version dropped the requirement for the Yakima, Colville, and Spokane 
tribes that any assumption be approved by a two-thirds vote at a tribal referendum. Cf. 1963 Wash. 
Sess. Laws 346, ch. 36; 1957 Wash. Sess. Laws 941, ch. 240. See infra note 178 for the seven tribes 
that achieved partial state jurisdiction. 
131. 53 Wash. 2d 789, 337 P.2d 33 (1959). 
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challenged a prosecution under the 1957 statute on the ground that the 
state’s enabling act and constitution disclaimed any jurisdiction over 
Indian lands.132 While Congress authorized states to amend their 
constitutions so that they could accept jurisdiction over Indian country 
under P.L. 280,133 Washington failed to do so. Nevertheless, the 
Washington State Supreme Court upheld Washington’s assertion of 
jurisdiction, reasoning that the state constitution need not be amended as 
a matter of P.L. 280 or state law.134 In addition to the Paul litigation, the 
Quinault Indian Nation unsuccessfully challenged Washington’s 
assertion of jurisdiction in federal court before the Ninth Circuit on the 
same state constitutional ground.135 After a later Ninth Circuit ruling that 
Washington’s partial assumption of jurisdiction scheme lacked a rational 
basis and thus violated the federal equal protection guarantee, the United 
States Supreme Court reversed, and also held that states with disclaimers 
in their constitutions were not required as a matter of federal law to 
amend them to assume P.L. 280 jurisdiction.136 
                                                     
132. The state’s enabling act provided: 
That the people inhabiting said proposed States do agree and declare that they forever disclaim 
all right and title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries thereof, and to 
all lands lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes; and that until the 
title thereto shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and remain 
subject to the disposition of the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain under the 
absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States . . . . 
Act of Feb. 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676 (emphasis added). It was mirrored in the state constitution. 
WASH. CONST. art. 26. 
133. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, § 6, 67 Stat. 590 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of any 
Enabling Act for the admission of a State, the consent of the United States is hereby given to the 
people of any State to amend, where necessary, their State constitution or existing statutes, as the 
case may be, to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction in 
accordance with the provisions of this Act.”). 
134. Paul, 53 Wash. 2d at 794, 337 P.2d at 37. 
135. Quinault Indian Nation v. Gallagher, 368 F.2d 648, 657–58 (9th Cir. 1966). The Quinault 
case is interesting for the fact that a group purporting to be the tribal council requested full state 
jurisdiction in 1958, and the state promptly assumed jurisdiction. Almost immediately, a petition 
signed by sixty-eight members repudiated the original request. Id. at 652. The Washington State 
Supreme Court later upheld the assumption per the original request. State v. Bertrand, 61 Wash. 2d 
333, 341, 378 P.2d 427, 432 (1963). Other cases challenging Washington’s mode of assumption are 
Makah Indian Tribe v. State, 76 Wash. 2d 485, 457 P.2d 590 (1969), Tonasket v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 
164, 525 P.2d 744 (1974), and Comenout v. Burdman, 84 Wash. 2d 192, 199, 525 P.2d 217, 221 
(1974). As early as 1972 there was a statewide tribal effort in Washington to obtain the retrocession 
of state jurisdiction under P.L. 280. See State Indian-Rights Leaders Ask Control Over Reservations, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 14, 1972, at A5 [hereinafter Indian-Rights Leaders Ask Control]; Leaders of 
30 State Tribes Agree on Goals for Indians, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 16, 1972, at A11. For a detailed 
discussion of tribal objections to P.L. 280, see Searching for an Exit, supra note 92, at 247–49, 263–
64. 
136. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 493, 
500–02 (1979), rev’g 552 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1977). The panel decision was prompted by an earlier 
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The 1963 legislation unilaterally asserted civil and criminal 
jurisdiction over (1) all off-reservation Indian country; (2) all 
reservations, not including Indians on tribal or allotted lands within “an 
established reservation”; and (3) Indians on tribal or allotted lands within 
“an established reservation” in the following eight subject matter 
areas:137 
(1) Compulsory school attendance; 
(2) Public assistance; 
(3) Domestic relations; 
(4) Mental illness; 
(5) Juvenile delinquency; 
(6) Adoption proceedings; 
(7) Dependent children; and 
(8) Operation of motor vehicles upon the public streets, alleys, 
roads and highways.138 
A threshold issue in each case involving state jurisdiction over an 
Indian is whether the alleged activity occurred on “tribal or allotted 
lands” within a “reservation” and thus is beyond the scope of state 
jurisdiction if not within one of the eight enumerated areas. For example, 
in State v. Boyd,139 the court determined that land owned by the United 
States Bureau of Reclamation within the Colville Reservation was not 
“tribal or allotted land” so that state criminal jurisdiction was 
permitted.140 In State v. Pink,141 the state lacked jurisdiction over a 
firearms offense on a state highway right-of-way because the court 
found that the underlying land was held in trust by the United States for 
the benefit of the tribe, therefore the state’s jurisdiction was limited to 
                                                     
en banc remand to determine the equal protection issue. 550 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1977) (en banc). 
137. This is a paraphrase of WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010 (2010). The verbatim text provides: 
The state of Washington hereby obligates and binds itself to assume criminal and civil 
jurisdiction over Indians and Indian territory, reservations, country, and lands within this state 
in accordance with the consent of the United States given by the act of August 15, 1953 (Public 
Law 280, 83rd Congress, 1st Session), but such assumption of jurisdiction shall not apply to 
Indians when on their tribal lands or allotted lands within an established Indian reservation and 
held in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the 
United States, unless the provisions of RCW 37.12.021 have been invoked, except for the 
following [eight areas] . . . . 
Id. For the enumerated eight areas, see infra text accompanying note 138. 
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.010. As set out in supra note 136, the Supreme Court upheld this 
scheme in the face of an equal protection challenge. 
139. 109 Wash. App. 244, 34 P.3d 912 (2001). 
140. Id. at 252, 34 P.3d at 916. 
141. 144 Wash. App. 945, 185 P.3d 634 (2008). 
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traffic offenses.142 The court ruled in State v. Jim143 that a treaty fishing 
access site was a “reservation” precluding state criminal or civil 
jurisdiction over Indians, except for the eight areas.144 In State v. 
Comenout,145 the court upheld criminal jurisdiction over tribal members 
violating state law on an off-reservation allotment.146 
Tribes formally recognized after P.L. 280 was amended in 1968 to 
require tribal consent to state jurisdiction under P.L. 280 are not subject 
to state jurisdiction under P.L. 280.147 In State v. Squally,148 the court 
faced the question of whether land added to the Nisqually reservation 
after 1968 was subject to state jurisdiction under P.L. 280. The court 
emphasized the Nisqually tribe’s original, broad request for full state 
jurisdiction of its reservation under the 1957 statute and ruled that trust 
land added to the reservation after 1968 was subject to state 
jurisdiction.149 It is significant that in one instance where Congress chose 
                                                     
142. Id. at 955, 185 P.3d at 639. The court rejected state jurisdiction because “the State has not 
shown that the Quinault Tribe relinquished its interest in the land.” Id. The state was not attempting 
a prosecution for a traffic offense, but for unlawful possession of a firearm—a crime that did not 
involve “operation of motor vehicles upon . . . [public] highways.” Id. at 956, 185 P.3d at 639. The 
court distinguished Somday v. Rhay, 67 Wash. 2d 180, 184, 406 P.2d 931, 934 (1965), which upheld 
full state jurisdiction over a highway right-of-way running across fee simple non-Indian land. The 
court reasoned that because the tribe had surrendered its entire interest in the surface and 
subsurface, the state could rely on its blanket assertion of jurisdiction over Indians on non-Indian 
fee lands. 
143. 173 Wash. 2d 672, 273 P.3d 434 (2012). 
144. Id. at 685, 273 P.3d at 440; see also State v. Sohappy, 110 Wash. 2d 907, 757 P.2d 509 
(1988) (holding that state did not have jurisdiction over an “in-lieu” fishing site that was created 
under federal law to replace Indian fishing grounds developed by construction of the Bonneville 
Dam). These cases could both have been decided on the alternative ground that P.L. 280’s 
disclaimer of jurisdiction over treaty fishing rights precluded state jurisdiction. That is, assuming 
P.L. 280 applied in full, it does not authorize jurisdiction over Indian treaty fishing rights. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1162(b) (2006). Another ground for denying state jurisdiction is based on the fact that the 
reservation Indian country was established after 1968 when tribal consent was made a prerequisite 
to state assumptions of jurisdiction. See infra note 147 and accompanying text. Moreover, state fish 
and game laws are part of a civil/regulatory regime and thus beyond P.L. 280’s grant. COHEN, supra 
note 2, § 18.03[2][b], at 1126–27. Any state jurisdiction over treaty hunting, fishing, or gathering 
activity by Indians, whether on or off-reservation, must conform to the “conservation necessity 
standards” set out by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id., § 18.04[3][b], at 1143–46; Washington v. Wash. 
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 682 (1979). 
145. 173 Wash. 2d 235, 267 P.3d 355 (2011). 
146. Id. at 239, 267 P.3d at 357. 
147. Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 402, 406, 82 Stat. 79 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a), 1326 
(2006)); see COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.04[3][f][ii], at 577–78. 
148. 132 Wash. 2d 333, 343, 937 P.2d 1069, 1074 (1997). 
149. Similarly, in State v. Cooper, 130 Wash. 2d 770, 928 P.2d 406 (1996), the court ruled that 
state jurisdiction extended to off-reservation allotments that were in existence when the non-
consensual 1963 law passed. The court stated: “We assume, without deciding, that the subsequent 
establishment of a new Indian reservation vitiates the pre-existing RCW 37.12.010 assumption of 
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to make P.L. 280 applicable to lands taken in trust in a P.L. 280 state 
after 1968 for a restored tribe it explicitly so provided.150 If the 
preexisting assertion of state jurisdiction under P.L. 280 extended to 
newly recognized tribes and Indian country, Congress’s action would 
have been unnecessary. Moreover, the Indian law canons of construction 
counsel against broadly interpreting P.L. 280 to the detriment of tribal 
sovereignty as “statutes passed for the benefit of dependent Indian 
tribes . . . are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being 
resolved in favor of the Indians.”151 
If a prosecution under P.L. 280 arises anywhere within Indian 
country, the court must undertake an analysis of the criminal/prohibitory 
civil/regulatory dichotomy.152 As a threshold matter, recall that state 
civil jurisdiction under P.L. 280 is limited to “opening the courthouse 
door” and does not authorize the exercise of state regulatory 
jurisdiction.153 Thus, whenever the state asserts criminal jurisdiction 
over an Indian, the prosecution must demonstrate that the conduct is 
prohibited as a matter of state law and is not actually part of a civil 
regulatory regime. 
A significant amount of litigation has involved activity on public 
highways under the eighth category— operation of vehicles on public 
highways.154 In State v. Abrahamson,155 Division I of the Washington 
State Court of Appeals correctly upheld a drunk driving conviction on 
                                                     
state jurisdiction with respect to Indian lands within the boundaries of the new reservation.” Id. at 
781 n.6, 928 P.2d at 411 n.6 (emphasis in original). The court elaborated: “Four reservations were 
formed after 1968, and their membership never elected to come under state jurisdiction. The 
Jamestown-Klallam, Nooksack, Sauk Suiattle and Upper Skagit reservations are not subject to 
RCW 37.12.010.” Id. (citing Pamela B. Loginsky, Criminal Jurisdiction Issues, in WASH. STATE 
BAR ASS’N, CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. COMM. & INDIAN LAW SECTION, PERSPECTIVES ON INDIAN 
LAW, at 4–8 (1992)). The list should also include the Stillaguamish, Cowlitz, and Snoqualmie 
Tribes, who were formally acknowledged after 1968, and whose reservations were similarly 
established after 1968. The Cowlitz Tribe does not yet have a reservation. 
150. 25 U.S.C. § 715d (authorizing state jurisdiction over Coquille Tribe in Oregon—a 
mandatory P.L. 280 state). 
151. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); see COHEN, supra note 2, 
§ 6.04[3][f][ii], at 577–78; Leonhard, supra note 128, at 712–14. 
152. See supra Part III.B. This would include the state’s assertion of jurisdiction over off-
reservation trust lands and allotments as well as fee lands within reservations. See COHEN, supra 
note 2, § 6.04[3][b], at 546–53 for a detailed discussion of the scope of jurisdiction granted by P.L. 
280. 
153. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1991); 
see CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 17–18 (discussing Washington jurisdictional scheme). 
154. See cases cited supra note 141 and infra notes 155, 157, 160, 162. 
155. 157 Wash. App. 672, 238 P.3d 533 (2010). 
04 - Anderson Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2012   7:36 PM 
942 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:915 
 
public roads on the Tulalip Indian Reservation.156 Drunk driving seems 
clearly to fall on the criminal/prohibitory side of the P.L. 280 dichotomy. 
On the other hand, in the case of an individual who did not consent to a 
breathalyzer or blood draw test and was accordingly subject to a civil 
suspension of his license, another court held that “[s]tatutes that 
authorize evidence collection in support of prosecuting criminal cases 
are properly classified as criminal in nature.”157 While the court may be 
correct as to the authority to gather evidence from a defendant in support 
of a prosecution over which P.L. 280 grants jurisdiction, the court’s 
reasoning as to the criminality of the implied consent statute is doubtful. 
This is because the only sanction for refusing a blood or breathalyzer test 
is a civil license suspension, and the legislature explicitly provided that 
refusal to comply with the implied consent statute “is designated as a 
traffic infraction and may not be classified as a criminal offense.”158 The 
court also inferred that the criminal/prohibitory civil/regulatory 
distinction mandated by the United States Supreme Court might not 
apply because Washington assumed jurisdiction in a more limited way 
than the mandatory states involved in Cabazon and Bryan.159 This seems 
incorrect and inconsistent with Confederated Tribes of the Colville 
Reservation v. Washington,160 where the tribes successfully challenged 
the state’s authority over traffic offenses under P.L. 280. In Colville, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that Washington may not regulate speeding by tribal 
members because speeding is not a criminal offense, but rather a civil 
infraction sanctioned by a fine; the court drew no distinction based on 
whether a state is one of the six mandatory jurisdictions under P.L. 
280.161 However, in Yallup it was likely proper to use the result of the 
                                                     
156. Id. at 685, 238 P.3d at 539. 
157. State v. Yallup, 160 Wash. App. 500, 508, 248 P.3d 1095, 1099 (2011). 
158. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.63.020 (2010). The legislature made a long list of exceptions to the 
rule, but did not include § 46.20.308(2)(a), which is the implied consent suspension statute. See id. 
At the same time, the court cited Abrahamson, 157 Wash. App. 672, 238 P.3d 533, which held that 
the state did have jurisdiction over the underlying drunk driving offense. Id. 
159. Yallup, 160 Wash. App. at 506, 248 P.3d at 1098. 
160. 938 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1991). 
161. Id. at 147–48. It is important to remember that P.L. 280’s grant of civil jurisdiction only 
opened the courthouse door to private civil disputes. Thus, state courts may entertain personal injury 
lawsuits involving Indians arising within reservations on public highways. McCrea v. Denison, 76 
Wash. App. 95, 885 P.2d 856 (1994). Moreover, under Washington Superior Court Rule 82.5(b), 
state courts may defer to tribal court jurisdiction. WASH. SUP. CT. R. 82.5(b). That rule, adopted in 
1995, provides: 
Where an action is brought in the superior court of any county of this state, and where, under 
the Laws of the United States, concurrent jurisdiction over the matter in controversy has been 
granted or reserved to an Indian tribal court of a federally recognized Indian tribe, the superior 
court may, if the interests of justice require, cause such action to be transferred to the 
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blood test in aid of the conviction for driving under the influence 
because the state has jurisdiction over Indians on public highways and 
the blood draw took place on fee land where the state has full P.L. 280 
jurisdiction.162 The defendant was properly subject to criminal 
prosecution for driving under the influence, but a civil sanction for 
refusing a test under the implied consent statute would be of doubtful 
validity. 
There has been much less litigation involving the other seven 
categories encompassed by the statute. The state asserted jurisdiction 
over public assistance under category (2), although no reported decisions 
have been located. Three of the categories—domestic relations (category 
3),163 adoption proceedings (category 6), and dependent children 
(category 7)—relate to family law matters and allow state courts to 
adjudicate matters involving family relationships.164 It is more difficult 
to determine the jurisdiction permissible in terms of commitments for 
mental illness (category 4). Under the reasoning of Doe v. Mann, such 
status determinations presumably would be within state civil 
                                                     
appropriate Indian tribal court. In making such determination, the superior court shall consider, 
among other things, the nature of the action, the interests and identities of the parties, the 
convenience of the parties and witnesses, whether state or tribal law will apply to the matter in 
controversy, and the remedy available in such Indian tribal court. 
Id. 
162. Yallup, 160 Wash. App. at 503, 248 P.3d at 1097. When a state officer wishes to conduct a 
search in territory where the state lacks jurisdiction under P.L. 280, the proper recourse is to obtain 
a warrant from the tribal court. Cf. South Dakota v. Cummings, 679 N.W.2d 484 (S.D. 2004). 
163. In Estate of Cross, 126 Wash. 2d 43, 50, 891 P.2d 26, 29 (1995), the Washington State 
Supreme Court responded to a certified question from the United States Tax Court ruling that 
“[c]ommunity property law is included under domestic relations [for purposes of P.L. 280 
jurisdiction].” Interestingly, the court noted that “the United States Tax Court must make a factual 
inquiry as to whether any tribal custom existed and if so whether the customs contradict or 
supplement Washington community property law.” Id. at 49–50, 891 P.2d at 29. The court did not 
consider other objections based on federal law. Id. at 49, 891 P.2d at 28–29. Of course, P.L. 280 
expressly denies the application of state law or state jurisdiction to distribution of trust or restricted 
property in probate proceedings or otherwise. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2006). 
164. Prior to assumption of jurisdiction, it was clear that juvenile courts lacked jurisdiction to 
enter dependency and delinquency determinations involving Indian children within Indian country. 
See State ex rel. Adams v. Superior Court, 57 Wash. 2d 181, 356 P.2d 985 (1960). Adams was a 
companion case to In re Colwash, 57 Wash. 2d 196, 356 P.2d 994 (1960). After the 1963 
assumption of jurisdiction, the court in Comenout v. Burdman, 84 Wash. 2d 192, 201, 525 P.2d 217, 
222 (1974), upheld state jurisdiction over child dependency matters. The case was decided before 
the U.S. Supreme Court developed the civil/regulatory limitation on state jurisdiction in Bryan v. 
Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976). If viewed as a civil regulatory proceeding due to the coercive 
effect on parental rights, jurisdiction over such matters may no longer be with the state. See supra 
notes 112 and 114 and the accompanying discussion of Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 
2005). In any event, the exercise of any state jurisdiction in child custody proceedings must take 
place in conformity with the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–63 (2006). 
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adjudicatory jurisdiction,165 although the coercive effect of a civil 
commitment may make it fall on the civil/regulatory divide of P.L. 280 
and thus beyond state jurisdiction. Adjudication of matters involving 
juvenile delinquency (category 5) includes criminal matters on tribal and 
allotted lands.166 On the other hand, with regard to compulsory school 
attendance (category 1), one might expect state authority on trust and 
allotted lands within reservations to be limited, or non-existent, because 
regulation of school attendance seems to be a civil regulatory matter. 
This is especially true because there is a federal statute that expressly 
authorizes state jurisdiction over such on-reservation matters, but only 
when the tribe has consented to state jurisdiction, and the Secretary of 
the Interior has approved the state jurisdiction.167 That the state’s 
assumption of jurisdiction over the eight areas took place years before 
the civil regulatory/adjudicatory dichotomy was revealed by the 
Supreme Court in Bryan v. Itasca County and amplified in Cabazon 
Band 168 would explain how the legislature misconceived its authority on 
the civil/regulatory side. 
Now, anyone has to admit that this is a very complex and confusing 
jurisdictional scheme. Nevertheless, state and tribal officials, courts, and 
the public must deal with the piecemeal fashion in which state 
jurisdiction has been imposed. One way to deal with it would be to 
simply get rid of all P.L. 280 jurisdiction—something made possible by 
Congress. 
                                                     
165. See supra notes 112 and 114 and accompanying text for a discussion of Doe v. Mann, 415 
F.3d 1038. 
166. Juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction under Washington law over matters “[r]elating to 
juveniles alleged or found to have committed offenses, traffic or civil infractions, or violations as 
provided in RCW 13.40.020 through 13.40.230[.]” WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.030(1)(e) (2010). To 
the extent that a juvenile has committed a traffic or civil infraction, state court jurisdiction would 
not exist because the state’s authority is limited to criminal jurisdiction and does not include civil 
regulatory authority. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation v. Washington, 938 F.2d 146 (9th 
Cir. 1991). 
167. 25 U.S.C. § 231 (2006). The implementing regulations at 25 C.F.R. § 273.52 (2012) refer to 
P.L. 280 as if it conferred similar authority, but the regulation was adopted in 1975 and thus 
predates the decision in Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, which made it clear that civil 
regulatory jurisdiction was not granted by P.L. 280. See COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.04[5][a], at 586; 
cf. Colwash, 57 Wash. 2d at 198–99, 356 P.2d at 996 (holding that state jurisdiction over truancy 
matters under 25 U.S.C. § 231 would not extend to dependency proceeding). 
168. See CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 17–18 (discussing Washington’s jurisdictional 
scheme). 
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V.  CONGRESS AMENDED P.L. 280 SO STATES MAY 
RETROCEDE JURISDICTION, BUT TRIBES HAVE NO 
FORMAL ROLE IN THE PROCESS 
When P.L. 280 was passed, tribal dissatisfaction with the unilateral 
assertion of state jurisdiction was widespread and well documented.169 
Adopted in the midst of the now-repudiated termination era, the statute 
and the state jurisdiction that accompanied it—most often without tribal 
consent—are illustrative of discredited policies inconsistent with the 
modern Indian self-determination policies. Washington tribes reacted to 
this by initiating concerted efforts in 1972 to remove state jurisdiction 
from their Indian country.170 When a local congressman claimed before a 
congressional committee that jurisdictional confusion had been solved in 
Washington under P.L. 280, the Vice-President of the National Congress 
of American Indians, Mel Tonasket, retorted, “[Congressman] Meeds 
made some statements that are totally false . . . . He should know 
better.”171 
Like Washington tribes, national Indian organizations were consistent 
in their opposition to the unilateral imposition of P.L. 280 jurisdiction on 
tribes.172 In one of many cases challenging the state’s assertion of P.L. 
280 jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit observed that, “Indian tribes were 
critical of Pub. L. 280 because section 7 authorized the application of 
state law to tribes without their consent and regardless of their needs or 
circumstances.”173 In 1968, Congress repealed the section of P.L. 280 
that allowed states to acquire jurisdiction without tribal consent. It also 
amended the statute by providing that “[t]he United States is authorized 
to accept a retrocession by any State of all or any measure of the 
criminal or civil jurisdiction, or both, acquired by such State pursuant to 
[P.L. 280].”174 The President of the United States authorized the 
Secretary of the Interior to accept a state’s retrocession after consulting 
with the Attorney General.175 However, the Secretary is not required to 
                                                     
169. See Leonhard, supra note 128, at 698–701. 
170. See Indian-Rights Leaders Ask Control, supra note 135. 
171. David Suffia, Indian Leader Says Meeds Lied About Effects of Policing, SEATTLE TIMES, 
May 31, 1978, at G7. Mr. Tonasket was also the Chairman of the Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Reservation. Id. 
172. 1 AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM’N, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 205–06 (1977) 
(discussing events leading to a draft retrocession bill introduced in 1975 by Senator Henry Jackson). 
173. United States v. Lawrence, 595 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 1979). 
174. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 403, 82 Stat. 79 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 1323 (2006)). 
175. Exec. Order No. 11,435, 33 Fed. Reg. 17,339 (Nov. 23, 1968). 
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accept the retrocession. As a practical matter, the Secretary considers the 
law enforcement capacity of the tribe and the United States with respect 
to any retrocession in order to avoid a decrease in on-the-ground law 
enforcement. Also, the views of the Justice Department carry great 
weight because the local U.S. Attorney and FBI would have increased 
obligations to enforce federal criminal laws in Indian country after any 
retrocession. Since 1968, there have been thirty-one tribes that have fully 
or partially achieved state retrocession over some or all of the Indian 
country under their jurisdiction.176 Prior to 2012, Washington’s 
retrocession laws provided that certain tribes that agreed to full state 
criminal and civil jurisdiction under the 1957 state law could request 
retrocession of some (but not all) state criminal jurisdiction.177 There 
was no provision for retrocession of civil jurisdiction. Of the eleven 
tribes that requested full state jurisdiction under the 1957 state law, 
seven requested and were granted retrocession.178 
                                                     
176. Searching for an Exit, supra note 92, at 265–66; CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 166. 
There are 170 tribes in the lower forty-eight states that are subject to state authority under P.L. 280. 
CAROLE GOLDBERG & DUANE CHAMPAGNE, NATIVE NATION LAW & POLICY CTR., FINAL REPORT: 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNDER PUBLIC LAW 280, at 9–11 (2007) [hereinafter 
FINAL REPORT], available at http://cdn.law.ucla.edu/SiteCollectionDocuments/ 
centers%20and%20programs/native%20nations/pl280%20study.pdf. The Federal Register 
announcements accepting retrocession are as follows: 
(1) full civil and criminal jurisdiction: fifteen Nevada tribes, 40 Fed. Reg. 27,501 (June 30, 
1975); Ely Indian Colony, 53 Fed. Reg. 5837 (Feb. 26, 1988); Menominee, 41 Fed. Reg. 8516 
(Feb. 27, 1976); Burns Paiute, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,169 (May 4, 1979); Omaha, 35 Fed. Reg. 
16,598 (Oct. 16, 1970); Santee Sioux, 71 Fed. Reg. 7994 (Feb. 15, 2006); 
(2) criminal retrocession only: Umatilla, 46 Fed. Reg. 2195 (Jan. 8, 1981), Winnebago, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 24,234 (July 2, 1986); Bois Forte Band of Chippewa, 40 Fed. Reg. 4026 (Jan. 27, 1975); 
and 
(3) partial criminal retrocession: Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 60 Fed. Reg. 
33,318 (June 27, 1995); seven Washington tribes listed in infra note 178. 
177. The current statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.120 (2010), provides: 
Whenever the governor receives from the confederated tribes of the Colville reservation or the 
Quileute, Chehalis, Swinomish, Skokomish, Muckleshoot, or Tulalip tribe a resolution 
expressing their desire for the retrocession by the state of all or any measure of the criminal 
jurisdiction acquired by the state pursuant to RCW 37.12.021 over lands of that tribe’s 
reservation, the governor may, within ninety days, issue a proclamation retroceding to the 
United States the criminal jurisdiction previously acquired by the state over such reservation. 
However, the state of Washington shall retain jurisdiction as provided in RCW 37.12.010. The 
proclamation of retrocession shall not become effective until it is accepted by an officer of the 
United States government in accordance with 25 U.S.C. Sec. 1323 (82 Stat. 78, 79) and in 
accordance with procedures established by the United States for acceptance of such 
retrocession of jurisdiction. The Colville tribes and the Quileute, Chehalis, Swinomish, 
Skokomish, Muckleshoot, and Tulalip tribes shall not exercise criminal or civil jurisdiction 
over non-Indians. 
Id. 
178. The Muckleshoot, Squaxin Island, Skokomish, and Nisqually Indian tribes remain subject to 
full state jurisdiction. The seven tribes who achieved limited retrocession are: Tulalip Tribes, 65 
Fed. Reg. 75,948 (Dec. 5, 2000) and 65 Fed. Reg. 77,905 (Dec. 13, 2000); Confederated Tribes of 
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In the 2011 Washington State legislative session, Representative John 
McCoy introduced a bill that permitted the full or partial retrocession of 
state criminal jurisdiction to the United States upon an Indian tribe’s 
request.179 The bill required the Governor to issue a proclamation 
retroceding state criminal jurisdiction if requested by the Indian tribe180 
and acknowledged that retrocession would only become effective if 
accepted by a duly designated officer of the United States 
government.”181 The Secretary of the Interior is the officer designated to 
accept a retrocession.182 A subsequent amendment—offered by 
Representative McCoy—would have eliminated the Governor’s 
obligation to issue a retrocession proclamation upon receipt of a request 
from a tribe and instead provide her with discretion to approve a 
retrocession petition and forward a proclamation to the Secretary of the 
Interior.183 While the bill did not become law, there was tremendous 
interest in the proposal from tribes, the U.S. Attorney’s office, and state 
law enforcement entities. The premise of the proposed legislation was 
that Indian tribes should have the choice whether to be subject to state 
jurisdiction, and that it was unfair for Congress to allow state jurisdiction 
without tribal consent. 
The Governor, Speaker of the House, and President of the Senate 
appointed a Joint Executive-Legislative Workgroup to consider 
retrocession issues before the 2012 legislative session.184 A letter signed 
by Governor Gregoire, House Speaker Frank Chopp, and Senate 
President Lisa Brown explained: 
It became apparent that retrocession is an issue of broad 
importance to the tribes; federal, state and local governments; 
and the citizenry of Washington. It also became apparent that 
retrocession is not generally understood and that a coordinated 
and focused effort would be necessary to give the issue the 
                                                     
the Chehalis Reservation, Quileute Indian Reservation, and Swinomish Tribal Community, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 19,959 (May 9, 1989); Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 52 Fed. Reg. 8372 
(Mar. 17, 1987); Suquamish (Port Madison), 37 Fed. Reg. 7353 (Apr. 13, 1972); Quinault Indian 
Nation, 34 Fed. Reg. 14,288 (Aug. 30, 1969). 
179. H.B. 1773, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011). 
180. Id. § 3. 
181. Id. § 4. 
182. See Exec. Order No. 11,435, 33 Fed. Reg. 17,339 (Nov. 23, 1968). 
183. H.B. 1773, H. Amd. 343, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011). 
184. See FINAL B. REP., E.S.H.B. 2233, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2012). For information 
about the task force see http://www.leg.wa.gov/jointcommittees/JELWGTR/Pages/default.aspx. The 
Task Force included the author of this Article and Professor Douglas Nash of Seattle University 
School of Law as academic advisors. 
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attention it deserves and allow all affected parties an opportunity 
to discuss and understand potential implications. 
  Accordingly, we have agreed to establish a Joint Executive-
Legislative Workgroup on Tribal Retrocession.185 
The twenty-member task force met four times between July and 
November for in-depth discussions of the issues and development of a 
draft bill. A wide variety of constituencies provided information and 
advice to the task force, which discussed a draft bill at its final meeting 
in November 2011.186 As a result, members of the State House and 
Senate introduced identical bills at the start of the 2012 Session—House 
Bill 2233187 and Senate Bill 6147.188 The 2012 version of the bill 
included two major changes. First, it afforded the Governor discretion to 
reject a tribal petition for retrocession, and second, allowed for 
retrocession of civil as well as criminal jurisdiction. The new legislation 
was approved in the Senate on March 5, 2012 by a vote of 42-6, and in 
the House by a vote of 59-38 on March 6, 2012.189 It became effective 
on June 7, 2012, ninety days after the Governor signed the bill, as 
provided by state law.190 
Washington’s 2012 retrocession legislation authorizes the Governor 
to forward a proclamation for retrocession to the Secretary of the Interior 
when certain conditions are met. While previous law permitted only the 
partial retrocession of criminal jurisdiction and no retrocession of civil 
jurisdiction (and now applies to only two of the four tribes that remain 
subject to full state jurisdiction), the new legislation allows for 
retrocession of “all or part of the civil and/or criminal jurisdiction 
previously acquired by the state over a federally recognized Indian tribe, 
and the Indian country of such tribe.”191 The process is commenced by a 
tribal resolution and would be carried out in the following fashion: 
(1) The governing body of a tribe submits a resolution to the 
                                                     
185. Letter from Christine O. Gregoire, Frank Chopp & Lisa Brown to Eric Johnson, Exec. Dir., 
Wash. State Ass’n of Cntys., (May 26, 2011) (on file with Washington Law Review). 
186. Joint Executive-Legislative Workgroup on Tribal Retrocession, WASH. STATE 
LEGISLATURE, http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/JELWGTR/Documents/2011-11-16/ 
Agenda.pdf (Nov. 16, 2011). The agendas for all four meetings reveal the wide array of witnesses 
who assisted the Task Force. WASH. STATE LEGISLATURE, supra, at http://www.leg.wa.gov/ 
jointcommittees/JELWGTR/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). 
187. H.B. 2233, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012). 
188. S.B. 6417, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012). 
189. FINAL B. REP., E.S.H.B. 2233, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 (Wash. 2012). 
190. E.S.H.B. 2233, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 5 (Wash. 2012) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 37.12.160–.180 (2012)). 
191. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.160(1). 
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Governor requesting retrocession with information regarding the 
tribe’s plan to exercise jurisdiction after retrocession.192 
(2) Within ninety days of receiving the resolution, the Governor 
must convene a government-to-government meeting with the 
tribal governing body or its designated representatives. The 
Governor’s office must also consult with elected officials of 
state political subdivisions located near the Indian tribe’s 
territory.193 
(3) The Governor has one year after receiving the tribal 
resolution to approve or deny the request in whole or in part, 
although extensions may be made for any term by agreement, or 
unilaterally by either party for six months. Any denial of a tribal 
request must be supported by reasons set out in writing by the 
Governor. If accepted, a proclamation to that effect must be 
issued and forwarded on to the Secretary of the Interior within 
ten days.194 
(4) Within 120 days of receiving the tribal resolution, but before 
approving it, designated standing committees of each house in 
the legislature must be notified, and they may have hearings and 
make non-binding recommendations to the Governor.195 
(5) The proclamation for retrocession will not be effective until 
accepted by a “duly designated officer of the United States 
government.”196 
                                                     
192. Id. § 37.12.160(2) (“The resolution must express the desire of the tribe for the retrocession 
by the state of all or any measures or provisions of the civil and/or criminal jurisdiction acquired by 
the state under this chapter over the Indian country and the members of such Indian tribe. Before a 
tribe submits a retrocession resolution to the governor, the tribe and affected municipalities are 
encouraged to collaborate in the adoption of interlocal agreements, or other collaborative 
arrangements, with the goal of ensuring that the best interests of the tribe and the surrounding 
communities are served by the retrocession process.”). 
193. Id. § 37.12.160(3). 
194. Id. § 37.12.160(4). 
195. Id. § 37.12.160(5). 
196. Id. § 37.12.160(6). This section also refers to “procedures established by the United States 
for the approval of a proposed state retrocession.” Id. There are no formal procedures aside from the 
delegation of authority from the President to the Secretary of the Interior, who must consult with the 
United States Attorney General before accepting a retrocession and publishing the determination in 
the Federal Register. Here is the Executive Order: 
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 465 of the Revised Statutes (25 U.S.C. 9) 
[§ 9 of this title] and as President of the United States, the Secretary of the Interior is hereby 
designated and empowered to exercise, without the approval, ratification, or other action of the 
President or of any other officer of the United States, any and all authority conferred upon the 
United States by section 403(a) of the Act of April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 79 (25 U.S.C. 1323(a)) 
[subsection (a) of this section]: Provided, That acceptance of retrocession of all or any measure 
of civil or criminal jurisdiction, or both, by the Secretary hereunder shall be effected by 
publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER of a notice which shall specify the jurisdiction 
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(6) If the proclamation addressesjurisdiction over public roads, 
the Governor must consider: (a) whether tribal interlocal 
agreements exist with other jurisdictions that address uniformity 
of motor vehicle operations in Indian country; (b) whether there 
is a tribal police department to ensure safety; (c) whether the 
tribe has traffic codes and courts; and (d) whether there are 
appropriate traffic control devices in place.197 
(7) The legislation contains savings clauses that reserve any 
state jurisdiction over civil commitment of sexually violent 
predators under state law,198 and ensures that cases commenced 
in state courts or agencies prior to the effective date of a 
retrocession may continue.199 It also provides that the tribes 
covered by the existing partial retrocession scheme would 
remain eligible to use that mechanism.200 
The Joint Executive-Legislative Work Group on Tribal Retrocession 
worked hard to understand the complex legal and policy issues 
implicated in Indian country. The task force’s leadership received input 
from state, federal, and tribal law experts to understand how tribal 
desires for retrocession of state civil and criminal jurisdiction could best 
be accomplished, and the effects of retrocession on both Indian and non-
Indian parties. Those concerns were taken into account in a fashion that 
provides for non-tribal input to a process that tribes may initiate and 
present directly to the Governor.201 In the end, however, the Governor 
                                                     
retroceded and the effective date of the retrocession: Provided further, That acceptance of such 
retrocession of criminal jurisdiction shall be effected only after consultation by the Secretary 
with the Attorney General. 
LYNDON B. JOHNSON 
Exec. Order No. 11,435, 33 Fed. Reg. 17,339 (Nov. 23, 1968); 25 U.S.C.A. § 1323 Note.  
197. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.160(8). This section was the last amendment to the bill. An 
earlier Senate amendment would have required the Governor (and in some cases other state 
agencies) to certify that actions and agreements on the foregoing matters (including inter-local 
agreements) were actually in place. E.S.H.B. 2233, S. Amd. 153, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 
2012). The House refused to concur in the Senate version and a Senate substitute bill was passed to 
provide that the Governor should simply consider the issues in making her decision on a 
retrocession proclamation. E.S.H.B. 2233, S. Amd. 282, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012). This 
version passed the Senate on March 5, 2012 and the House concurred on March 6, 2012. H.B. REP. 
E.S.H.B. 2233, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess., at 1 (Wash. 2012). 
198. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.170(1). 
199. Id. § 37.12.170(2). 
200. Id. § 37.12.180. The preexisting partial retrocession is available for the two tribes that have 
not utilized the partial retrocession process—Skokomish and Muckleshoot. Id. § 37.12.100. 
Curiously, that statute does not extend to the other two tribes that requested full P.L. 280 
jurisdiction under the 1957 statute: Squaxin Island and Nisqually. Id. 
201. Id. § 37.12.160(2) (“Before a tribe submits a retrocession resolution to the governor, the 
tribe and affected municipalities are encouraged to collaborate in the adoption of interlocal 
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has discretion to accept to a tribal petition. 
VI. THE MODERN SELF-DETERMINATION POLICY IS 
INCOMPLETE WITHOUT TRIBAL AUTHORITY TO 
INITIATE RETROCESSION AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
A. Washington’s 2012 Retrocession Legislation Is an Excellent Model 
for Negotiating Jurisdiction in Indian Country 
It should be apparent by now that criminal jurisdiction in Indian 
country is unduly complex, and does not work very well. The regime is 
governed by federal law, and was imposed generally without tribal 
consent in a piecemeal fashion. Congress found in 2010 that: 
The complicated jurisdictional scheme that exists in Indian country— 
(A) has a significant negative impact on the ability to provide 
public safety to Indian communities; 
(B) has been increasingly exploited by criminals; and 
(C) requires a high degree of commitment and cooperation 
among tribal, Federal, and State law enforcement officials[.]202 
In any given case, federal, tribal, and state police and prosecutors 
determine jurisdiction in Indian country based on whether an Indian is 
involved in a crime as defendant or victim,203 and the nature of the 
offense. Indians may be federally prosecuted if they have committed an 
offense included in the Major Crimes Act.204 Indians and non-Indians 
alike are subject to prosecution under the Indian Country Crimes Act, 
but subject to exceptions in the case of Indian-on-Indian crimes, in cases 
of prosecutions of Indians already punished by a tribe, or in the case of a 
specific treaty exception.205 Non-Indian versus non-Indian crime is left 
to the states,206 unless it is also a violation of a general federal criminal 
                                                     
agreements, or other collaborative arrangements, with the goal of ensuring that the best interests of 
the tribe and the surrounding communities are served by the retrocession process.”); id. 
§ 37.12.160(8) (recommending state and local input regarding “the operation of motor vehicles 
upon the public streets, alleys, roads, and highways” after retrocession). 
202. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 202(a)(4), 124 Stat. 2262. 
203. See supra Part II.A. For a discussion of the factors bearing on whether an individual is an 
Indian for federal jurisdictional purposes, see United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223–27 (9th 
Cir. 2005) and Bethany R. Berger, “Power Over this Unfortunate Race”: Race, Politics and Indian 
Law in United States v. Rogers, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV 1957 (2004). 
204. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); see supra Part II.A. 
205. 18 U.S.C. § 1152. 
206. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881). 
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statute.207 P.L. 280 added to the complexity by transferring federal 
criminal and civil jurisdiction to six “mandatory” states, and authorizing 
other states to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction at their option.208 
The only empirical study of the transfer of jurisdiction to the states under 
P.L. 280 demonstrates that it did not improve law enforcement in Indian 
country, and in most cases, law enforcement services and tribal-state 
relations declined.209 As explained above in Part IV, Washington State 
assumed jurisdiction in a manner that passed rational basis review, but is 
otherwise bewildering. Moreover, the jurisdictional arrangements 
described above were not developed consistently with basic democratic 
consent principles.210 Rather, they were imposed upon Indian tribes by 
federal and state law in sporadic bursts. In recognition of this situation, 
the Washington State Legislature took a significant step to reduce the 
complexity of this arrangement by offering to surrender some of its 
jurisdiction in accord with tribal desires. 
Washington now has an excellent system to achieve retrocession at 
the state and tribal level.211 The new law has deadlines and provides an 
opportunity for all interested parties to have their interests heard in what 
are essentially negotiations between petitioning tribes and the 
Governor’s office. Professors Goldberg and Champagne have 
thoroughly documented the difficulties tribes have encountered 
achieving retrocession in other states when the only avenue runs directly 
through the state legislature.212 When the group retrocession for fifteen 
tribes in Nevada is excluded, there have only been sixteen discreet 
campaigns for full or partial retrocessions of state jurisdiction.213 In 
Nebraska, for example, the state legislature voted to retrocede most of its 
jurisdiction on the Omaha reservation in 1969. However, almost 
immediately after the Secretary of the Interior in 1970 accepted the 
retrocession, Nebraska sought to revoke its retrocession.214 The 
                                                     
207. See United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the federal 
conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, “is a federal criminal statute of nationwide applicability, and 
therefore applies equally to everyone everywhere within the United States, including Indians in 
Indian country”). 
208. See supra Part III. 
209. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 176. 
210. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
211. The approach originally advanced would be better as it would put the Washington tribes in 
control of whether and how much jurisdiction should be retroceded by the state, albeit subject to the 
discretion of the Secretary of the Interior to accept or reject the proffered retrocession. 
212. Searching for an Exit, supra note 92, at 264–68; CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 168. 
213. Searching for an Exit, supra note 92, at 266. 
214. CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 36, at 169–70. 
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Winnebago Tribe slowly built up its governmental infrastructure and 
petitioned the Nebraska legislature in 1974 for retrocession of both civil 
and criminal jurisdiction.215 An expensive and bruising political battle 
ensued with state jurisdiction under P.L. 280 remaining intact. 
Ultimately, Nebraska’s unicameral legislature voted to retrocede only 
criminal jurisdiction on the Winnebago Reservation in 1985.216 A 
political compromise had to be made by dropping the retrocession 
request as to civil jurisdiction, with much of the opposition based on the 
mistaken assumption that by retroceding civil jurisdiction, the tribe 
would be receiving more authority.217 
By contrast, Washington’s new approach provides a rational path for 
considering retrocession and its effect on all the affected parties. The 
legislature is not the place to work out the details of how retrocession 
will work for a particular tribe, the state, and the federal government. 
The legislature made the major policy decision to permit full or partial 
retrocession to occur at the request of the tribe. It requires the Governor 
to act on a tribal request under a one-year deadline so that inaction alone 
cannot frustrate tribal wishes.218 Moreover, “[i]n the event the governor 
denies all or part of the [tribal] resolution, the reasons for such denial 
must be provided to the tribe in writing.”219 If the Governor issues the 
requested proclamation, the crucial final step is convincing the Secretary 
                                                     
215. Id. at 171. 
216. Id. at 172–74; see Gabriela Stern, Senators Give Winnebagos Jurisdiction, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, Jan. 17, 1986 (recounting rancor and racism is the legislative effort to retrocede 
jurisdiction). The headline from the Omaha World-Herald is premised on the common 
misconception that retrocession of state jurisdiction bestows additional governmental powers on 
affected tribes. It does not. Rather, it simply removes concurrent state jurisdiction. 
217. Control of Civil Matters Called Next Logical Step, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, July 21, 1985. 
The article quotes one opponent: 
‘With civil retrocession, they would have the rule of the land,’ Freese said. ‘For example, they 
could put a $500,000 tax on a tavern business, and you either pay it or you go out of business. 
They could tax white-owned real estate. It could completely ruin the value of real estate.’ 
Id. The statement is absolutely incorrect as a matter of law. Tribal authority to tax non-members and 
their property is governed by a federal common law test unaffected by the application of P.L. 280. 
See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (striking down Navajo Nation’s tax on 
non-Indian fee simple property). 
218. WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.160(4) (2012). There is no guarantee that a Governor will grant a 
given retrocession petition, but one should expect good faith efforts to reach an accord. 
219. Id. We will soon be able to see how this process plays out as the Confederated Tribes and 
Bands of the Yakama Reservation submitted retrocession resolutions to the Governor of 
Washington in July 2012. Letter from Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation to 
Governor Christine Gregoire (July 16, 2012) (attaching Yakama Tribal Council Resolutions T-117-
12 and T-036-12) (on file with Washington Law Review). 
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of the Interior to accept the retrocession of state jurisdiction.220 
One observer of the Washington process argues that while it 
represents a good effort, “by placing the ultimate decision in the hands 
of the Governor and mandating the inclusion of non-Indian governments 
in the decision-making process, it does not truly place the power of 
consent [to state jurisdiction] back in the hands of tribes.”221 While it 
would be best for the legislature to place greater control in hands of the 
tribes, such an outcome is unlikely in the foreseeable future for several 
reasons. First, proposed legislation taking such an approach was 
introduced in 2011, but the sponsor soon amended it to give the 
Governor discretion whether to accept the proposed retrocession and the 
bill still failed to move out of committee.222 Second, state and local 
governing bodies surrendering jurisdiction will always insist on inserting 
their views into the substance and manner in which their jurisdiction will 
be affected.223 The ensuing dialogue may further understanding of tribal 
justice systems, and lead to cooperative arrangements under state, 
federal, and tribal laws that allow for mutual aid agreements and cross-
deputization of law enforcement officers.224 Yet, while the new 
legislation provides an opportunity for local government views to be 
considered, the legislature wisely rejected amendments that would have 
required the Governor to certify that certain intergovernmental 
agreements were actually in place.225 This is good because it allows 
                                                     
220. It would be useful if the Department of the Interior developed at least some guidelines for 
determining whether to accept a petition for retrocession. As it stands now, it is entirely an ad hoc 
process. See infra notes 254–58 and accompanying text for a reasonable approach under the Indian 
Child Welfare Act. 
221. Leonhard, supra note 128, at 721. Nevada is the only state to offer unconditional 
retrocession to any tribe that had not consented to state jurisdiction. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.430 
(2011); see CAPTURED JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 184–87 (discussing Nevada’s retrocession scheme 
in general and problems encountered by the Ely Colony); Acceptance of Offer to Retrocede 
Jurisdiction, 40 Fed. Reg. 27,501 (June 24, 1975). 
222. H.B. 1773, H. Amd. 343, 62d. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011). 
223. There was little (if any) overt opposition to the retrocession as the Task Force worked 
through the various issues. More typical were concerns expressed by the Washington State 
Association of Counties and the Kitsap County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office. Both were interested 
in ensuring efficient and coordinated service and law enforcement delivery after any retrocession. 
Memorandum from Russell D. Hauge, Kitsap Prosecuting Attorney, to Sarah Lambert, Legislative 
Assistant, Tribal Retrocession Work Group (Nov. 2, 2011) (on file with Washington Law Review); 
Letter from Wash. State Ass’n of Cntys. to Representative McCoy and Retrocession Work Group 
(Oct. 10, 2011) (on file with Washington Law Review). 
224. See Tassie Hanna, Sam Deloria & Charles E. Trimble, The Commission on State-Tribal 
Relations: Enduring Lessons in the Modern State-Tribal Relationship, 47 TULSA L. REV. 553, 
592 (2012) (discussing the virtues of intergovernmental cooperation). 
225. Compare E.S.H.B. 2233, S. Amd. 2233-S.E AMS ENGR S4848.E § 1(8) (passed Senate on 
Feb. 28, 2012), with E.S.H.B. 2233, S. Amd. 282, 2233-S.E AMS PRID S5296.1 § 1(8) (passed 
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Indian tribes to submit their retrocession petition when they feel they 
have adequately consulted with state and local officials and can make 
their case directly to the Governor.226 The consultation mandate and the 
possibility for legislative hearings provide opportunities to explore all 
issues of concern, but ultimately leave the negotiation process to the 
Executive Branch of state government and the petitioning Indian tribe. It 
also avoids giving local governments a veto. Rather, the consultation 
provisions help the tribal, state, and local officials think through the 
manner in which the shift in jurisdiction will be implemented, and the 
practical consequences of the changes. 
In fact, the negotiation process can facilitate better relations simply 
due to the increased mutual understanding that develops through the 
process. Indeed, several commentators have noted the benefits of tribal-
state negotiations in a variety of contexts. The late David H. Getches 
noted that “negotiated arrangements among governments concerning 
jurisdiction and the provision of government services on Indian 
reservations can give certainty and avoid the necessity of litigation.”227 
As stated by Professor Frank Pommersheim: “Without talk and 
conversation, there is no hope for the future of tribal-state relations. Yet 
hope must also encourage the energetic dialogue that animates and gives 
hope meaning in the first instance.”228 The goal is “to identify those 
common interests that are better served by cooperation and coordination 
                                                     
Senate on Mar. 5, 2012). The engrossed Senate Bill of Feb. 28, 2012 contained the mandatory 
certification language, which was rejected by the House and followed by the “striker” language of 
March 5, 2012. A complete history of the bill’s amendments can be found at 
http://dlr.leg.wa.gov/billsummary/default.aspx?bill=2233&year=2011. 
226. If state agencies and local entities were left completely out of the process, they could be 
expected to weigh in with their opposition at the stage when the Secretary of the Interior deliberates 
whether to accept the retrocession petition. Cf. Letter from Russell D. Hauge, Kitsap Prosecuting 
Attorney, to Governor Christine Gregoire (Sept. 14, 2012) (on file with Washington Law Review) 
(suggesting that the U.S. Attorney would not have adequate resources to prosecute non-Indians if 
state authority over non-Indian versus Indian crimes were no longer subject to state authority). 
227. David H. Getches, Negotiated Sovereignty: Intergovernmental Agreements with American 
Indian Tribes as Models for Expanding Self-Government, 1 REV. CONST. STUD. 120, 143 (1993). 
Dean Getches also canvassed other federal efforts to encourage tribal-state compacting over 
jurisdictional matters. Id. at 145–47; see also COHEN, supra note 2, § 6.05, at 589. 
228. Frank R. Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future, 36 S.D. L. REV. 239, 
276 (1991); see also Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights, Practical Reasoning and Negotiated 
Settlements, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (2010) (discussing how uncertainty in the water rights area 
“has created an environment in which creative, practical solutions to conflicts have emerged in the 
Indian water settlements approved by Congress”); P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence, Negotiating 
Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of 
the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365, 373 (1994) (“Tribal-state negotiations can be comprehensive, 
instead of piecemeal, as is inherent in case-by-case litigation.”). 
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than competition and confrontation.”229 
At the same time, a state process is not enough. For example, it 
remains to be seen whether the Governor will accept a proffered tribal 
request for retrocession. Governors should be expected to operate in 
good faith, but tribes are in the position of supplicants seeking 
restoration of a jurisdictional scheme that was altered without tribal 
consent. Congressional action is therefore necessary and desirable to 
reverse the effects of the unilateral grant of state authority under P.L. 
280. 
B. Federal Law Should Be Changed to Provide a Tribally-Controlled 
Process for Negotiating the Balance of Jurisdiction in Indian 
Country 
As noted at the outset of this Article, the consent of the governed has 
a hallowed place in the United States’ system of government as well as 
in emerging international law pertaining to indigenous peoples’ rights.230 
The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides that 
“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples . . . in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent 
before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures 
that may affect them.”231 As the brief historic survey of federal-state-
tribal relations set out in this Article reveals, the United Nations’ consent 
paradigm has rarely been followed in federal Indian policy. One hundred 
and fifty years of vacillating policies has left a legacy of many moral and 
legal wrongs that must be undone. While it is not practically possible to 
undo all of the harmful policies manifested in federal Indian law in one 
fell swoop, the modern era has seen some encouraging steps that can 
serve as a platform for constructing further improvements. 
President Nixon repudiated the termination policy and ushered in an 
era supportive of the federal-tribal relationship, announcing a new policy 
of “self-determination without termination.”232 Congress followed suit 
with the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 
1975,233 which allows for the transfer of the administration of federal 
                                                     
229. Hanna, Deloria & Trimble, supra note 223. This Article provides a comprehensive history of 
the efforts in the modern era to reach cooperative agreements in a wide variety of areas of concern 
to tribes and local non-Indian governments. 
230. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
231. U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
232. H.R. DOC. NO. 91-363, at 2 (1970). 
233. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended in 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–450n, 
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programs from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the tribes.234 That 
program was augmented by the Self-Governance Acts of 1988,235 
1994,236 and 2000,237 which establish flexible block grant systems for 
tribal delivery of services the federal government would otherwise 
provide.238 In a host of other statutes and administrative actions, the 
United States today encourages and supports tribal governmental 
institutions.239 These modern policies hearken back to the original tribal-
federal relationship that provided ample room for the exercise of tribal 
sovereignty within tribal territories. 
While the earliest treaties reflected a desire for mutual peace and 
intergovernmental respect, later treaties and agreements were geared to 
the United States’ acquisition of land.240 In return, the United States 
provided compensation in various forms. Most important from the 
Indian perspective were the promises of permanent homelands and 
recognition of the right to continue to exist as distinct sovereign 
peoples.241 Federal intervention in internal tribal matters has a suspect 
doctrinal pedigree, and the Supreme Court has acknowledged as much in 
cases decided more than a century apart.242 In fact, Indian treaties and 
treaty substitutes should be accorded quasi-constitutional status as they 
stand as the only consent-based, and thus legitimate, source of federal 
authority over Indian nations.243 The fact that the Supreme Court has 
                                                     
§§ 455–458e (2006)). 
234. COHEN, supra note 2, § 22.02, at 1346–49. 
235. Indian Self-Determination Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285 
(1988). 
236. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250. 
237. Omnibus Indian Advancement Act, Pub. L. No. 106–568, 114 Stat. 2868 (2000). 
238. 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa–458aaa-18. 
239. See, e.g., Native American Business Development, Trade Promotion, and Tourism Act of 
2000, P.L. 106-464, 114 Stat. 2012 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 4301(6)) (“[T]he United States has an 
obligation to guard and preserve the sovereignty of Indian tribes in order to foster strong tribal 
governments, Indian self-determination, and economic self-sufficiency among Indian tribes.”); 
Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67249 (Nov. 6, 2000) (affirming the federal trust 
responsibility to Indian tribes). An exhaustive discussion of federal programs supporting tribal self-
government and economic development can be found in COHEN, supra note 2, § 22, at 1335–1413. 
240. See COHEN, supra note 2, § 102[1], at 16–17. 
241. Id. § 1.03[6][a], at 64–65. 
242. Compare United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (rejecting the Constitution’s Indian 
Commerce Clause as a basis for federal jurisdiction over criminal jurisdiction in Indian country), 
with United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (“Congress’ legislative authority would rest in 
part, not upon ‘affirmative grants of the Constitution,’ but upon the Constitution’s adoption of 
preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in any Federal Government, namely, powers that this 
Court has described as ‘necessary concomitants of nationality.’”). 
243. See Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and 
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upheld harsh treatment of tribal legal rights at times244 does not mean 
that more enlightened treatment should not be forthcoming as a matter of 
policy. 
The self-determination policy, backstopped by the federal 
government’s trust responsibility to Indian nations,245 is the way that the 
United States’ promise of permanent tribal homelands under federal 
protection is manifested in the twenty-first century. The return to tribal 
control over criminal and civil jurisdiction in Indian country is an 
essential component of this move to self-determination. States’ rights are 
greatly valued in our federal system in order to facilitate legislative 
experimentation and local control. Indian tribes are the third sovereign 
mentioned in the Constitution. The same values favoring local control by 
states apply with even greater force since the tribes did not have a hand 
in the formation of the Constitution, and thus did not voluntarily submit 
themselves to the jurisdiction of the national government. In the course 
of setting aside Georgia’s claim of authority over the Cherokee Nation, 
Chief Justice Marshall noted that the “Indian nations had always been 
considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their 
original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from 
time immemorial.”246 Despite two centuries of inconsistent federal 
policies and actions, Chief Justice Marshall’s recognition of Indian 
autonomy and self-government is once again at the foundation of federal 
policy. It has not, however, been manifested in the context of criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country. 
Professor Kevin Washburn of the University of New Mexico School 
of Law underlined these issues when he described the federal criminal 
jurisdictional patchwork in Indian country as a relic of repudiated 
policies—an anomaly in the self-determination era. “The federal Indian 
country criminal justice regime reflects the unilateral imposition, by an 
external authority, of substantive criminal norms on separate and 
independent communities without their consent and often against their 
                                                     
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 406–17 (1993). As set out in the text 
accompanying supra note 1, the consent principle is foundational to federal, state, and international 
law. 
244. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding unilateral abrogation of 
Indian treaty despite promise that it would not be changed without the consent of three-fourths of 
adult male Indians). 
245. In Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942), the Supreme Court 
concluded that the United States “has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest 
responsibility and trust.” Id. 
246. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). 
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will.”247 Professor Washburn concluded his analysis by suggesting that 
Congress should consider an opt-out program for tribes for the removal 
of federal jurisdiction to be replaced by sole tribal authority.248 While 
Professor Washburn’s argument has merit, an even stronger case can be 
made for congressional approval of legislation to authorize tribes to 
remove state jurisdiction granted under P.L. 280. This is not a new idea. 
In 1975, a bill was introduced that would have authorized tribes to 
directly petition the Secretary of the Interior for the retrocession of state 
jurisdiction acquired under P.L. 280.249 The states would have had no 
role in the Secretary’s decision to accept a tribal retrocession request, 
and the Secretary could only reject the petition if “(1) the tribe has no 
applicable existing or proposed law and order code, or (2) the tribe has 
no plan for fulfilling its responsibilities under the jurisdiction sought to 
be reacquired or determined.”250 The bill never made it out of 
committee, but it could serve as a starting point for congressional action 
today. The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 increased tribal authority 
in sentencing, thus demonstrating Congress’s support for tribal courts.251 
It also allows tribes in mandatory P.L. 280 states to request the 
resumption of concurrent federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes 
Act and Indian Country Crimes Act.252 In addition, the Tribal Law and 
Order Act provides for appointment of tribal prosecutors to enforce 
federal law in federal courts against Indians and non-Indians alike.253 
While none of these provisions address the problem of unwanted state 
jurisdiction, it demonstrates federal support for tribal wishes regarding 
enhanced federal law enforcement. 
Another approach short of tribally-mandated retrocession, suggested 
by Professors Duane Champagne and Carole Goldberg,254 would be to 
                                                     
247. Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 
779, 782 (2006). Professor Washburn was confirmed by the Senate as the Assistant Secretary of 
Indian Affairs on September 21, 2012. 158 CONG. REC. S6685 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2012); Press 
Release, Dept. of Interior, Salazar Applauds Senate Confirmation of Kevin Washburn as Interior’s 
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs (Sept. 22, 2012), available at http://www.doi.gov/ 
news/pressreleases/Salazar-Applauds-Senate-Confirmation-of-Kevin-Washburn-as-Interiors-
Assistant-Secretary-for-Indian-Affairs.cfm. 
248. Washburn, supra note 247, at 853. 
249. Indian Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 1975, S. 2010, 94th Cong. (1975). 
250. Id. § 103(c). 
251. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
252. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(d) (2006); see supra note 86. 
253. 25 U.S.C. § 2810(d) (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 543 (2006). 
254. Professors Goldberg and Champagne are two of the leading authorities on P.L. 280 and 
authors of the only empirical study on the effects of P.L. 280. FINAL REPORT, supra note 176. 
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utilize the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) model, which permits 
partial retrocession of state P.L. 280 jurisdiction in child custody 
matters.255 In ICWA, a tribal petition to the Secretary of the Interior 
initiates the retrocession process and the Secretary has limited discretion 
to reject the petition.256 Moreover, if a tribal petition is denied, the 
Secretary must help the tribe cure any defects in the tribal plan to 
reassume exclusive jurisdiction.257 This is an effective approach as it 
explicitly targets jurisdiction conferred by P.L. 280 and similar statutes. 
While the Secretarial-approval role is somewhat paternalistic, the 
petitioning tribe is generally in control of the process, and Congress 
provided substantive standards to cabin the Secretary’s discretion.258 The 
affected state has no formal role in the process. 
The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)259 provides yet another 
model for intergovernmental cooperation in general, and respecting P.L. 
280 jurisdiction in particular. Under IGRA, casino-style gaming on 
Indian lands is prohibited unless an Indian tribe has reached an 
agreement (compact) with the state where the land is located.260 It allows 
Indian tribes to initiate negotiations in order to reach a tribal-state 
compact that would govern the terms of the gaming.261 If the process 
                                                     
255. Searching for an Exit, supra note 92, at 268–69. The ICWA of 1978 provides substantive 
and procedural protection for the benefit of Indian tribes and Indian families. Chief among these are 
provisions mandating the transfer of child custody proceedings from state to tribal courts at the 
request of a tribe or Indian custodian. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (2006); see Miss. Band of Choctaw v. 
Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
256. 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (“Any Indian tribe which became subject to State jurisdiction pursuant to 
the provisions of the Act of August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as amended by Title IV of the Act of 
April 11, 1968 (82 Stat. 73, 78), or pursuant to any other Federal law, may reassume jurisdiction 
over child custody proceedings. Before any Indian tribe may reassume jurisdiction over Indian child 
custody proceedings, such tribe shall present to the Secretary for approval a petition to reassume 
such jurisdiction which includes a suitable plan to exercise such jurisdiction.”). Implementing 
regulations are found at 25 C.F.R. pt. 13 (2012). 
257. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(c) (“If the Secretary disapproves any petition under subsection (a) of this 
section, the Secretary shall provide such technical assistance as may be necessary to enable the tribe 
to correct any deficiency which the Secretary identified as a cause for disapproval.”). 
258. Id. § 1918(b)(1) (“[T]he Secretary may consider, among other things: (i) whether or not the 
tribe maintains a membership roll or alternative provision for clearly identifying the persons who 
will be affected by the reassumption of jurisdiction by the tribe; (ii) the size of the reservation or 
former reservation area which will be affected by retrocession and reassumption of jurisdiction by 
the tribe; (iii) the population base of the tribe, or distribution of the population in homogeneous 
communities or geographic areas; and (iv) the feasibility of the plan in cases of multitribal 
occupation of a single reservation or geographic area.”). 
259. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21). 
260. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). Casino style gaming is defined as “class III gaming” in IGRA. See 
25 U.S.C. § 2703. 
261. Id. § 2710(d). 
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does not yield a compact, a judicially or administratively supervised 
arbitration process is imposed.262 While this model is not perfect,263 it 
has resulted in the greatest economic development in Indian country in 
the history of the United States.264 The premise of IGRA was that Indian 
tribes had a right to be free of state jurisdiction with respect to gaming 
activities. The statute codifies that right while also providing for some 
state involvement in the way gaming would occur. This has allowed 
tribes and states to develop relatively harmonious relationships pursuant 
to these intergovernmental compacts. The statute sets out items that may 
be included in a compact.265 It also enumerates certain matters that may 
not be the subject of negotiations, for example, states may not condition 
their agreement on a tribal concession to state taxation.266 IGRA 
expressly provides for the “allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction 
between the State and the Indian tribe necessary for the enforcement of” 
state or tribal laws directly related to “licensing and regulation of 
[gaming].”267 The criminal law enforcement provisions of IGRA 
preempt state gaming laws but authorize compact provisions to make 
state law applicable.268 Tribal-state compacts in Washington generally 
provide that Indian tribes shall be the primary enforcement and 
regulatory authorities respecting Indian gaming, but also authorize state 
enforcement of some state gambling laws.269 This Article does not 
                                                     
262. See id. § 2710(d)(7); 25 C.F.R. §§ 291.7–.11; Final Rule, Class III Gaming Procedures, 65 
Fed. Reg. 17,535, 17,536 (Apr. 12, 1999) (explaining process). 
263. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (holding that judicial supervision 
aspect may be barred by state sovereign immunity because Congress lacks power to waive state 
immunity pursuant to the Commerce Clause). A regulatory avenue was developed in response to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling. 25 C.F.R. pt. 291. 
264. See Washburn, supra note 95, at 422 (“Indian gaming is simply the most successful 
economic venture ever to occur consistently across a wide range of Indian reservations.”). 
265. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C). 
266. Id. § 2710(d)(4). 
267. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(i)–(ii). 
268. 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (2006) (“The United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over 
criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws that are made applicable under this 
section to Indian country, unless an Indian tribe pursuant to a Tribal-State compact approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior under section 11(d)(8) of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, or under any 
other provision of Federal law, has consented to the transfer to the State of criminal jurisdiction with 
respect to gambling on the lands of the Indian tribe.”). 
269. See, e.g., Tribal-State Compact for Class III Gaming Between the Snoqualmie Indian Tribe 
and the State of Washington, § 9, Wash.-Snoqualmie Tribe, Apr. 4, 2002, available at 
http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/0/NIGC%20Uploads/readingroom/compacts/Snoqualime%20Indian%2
0Tribe/snoqualmiecomp040402.pdf. All Tribal-State compacts are available from the National 
Indian Gaming Commission at http://www.nigc.gov/Reading_Room/Compacts.aspx. Washington 
also has a progressive tribal cross-deputization statute. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.92.020 (2010); see 
also supra note 73. 
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advocate a P.L. 280 retrocession approach that would require state 
agreement to remove the state jurisdiction granted by P.L. 280. Rather, 
the compacting model simply provides an example of tribal-state 
cooperation in criminal law enforcement matters when such negotiations 
are authorized under federal law. It is interesting that many of the 
Washington gaming compacts provide for a limited role of state law 
enforcement—especially with respect to non-Indians. Presumably, this is 
because an exclusive tribal and federal regime might create a practical 
vacuum for minor criminal offenses committed by non-Indians. Tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over such offenses would be barred by the Oliphant 
rule,270 and prosecution of minor crimes by non-Indians is often a low 
priority for federal prosecutors, or may fail for other reasons.271 A 
successful negotiation process allows the parties to step back from 
wooden, doctrinal positions and instead to focus on the substantive law 
enforcement issues at hand, and how best to implement an effective 
system in tribal territories. 
The foregoing statutory schemes offer useful concepts for tribal 
removal of unwanted state jurisdiction that should be part of a new 
approach to P.L. 280 retrocession pursuant to federal law. While 
imposing state jurisdiction on sovereign tribes without informed consent 
was bad policy and morally wrong, Congress should not simply oust 
state jurisdiction unilaterally. Instead, a better approach is one that melds 
the ideas of encouraging negotiations and compacting as in IGRA, with 
ultimate power in the tribes to petition the Secretary for a full or partial 
removal of state jurisdiction as provided in ICWA. Consultation with the 
affected state should be mandated at a minimal level to encourage 
intergovernmental cooperation without imposing undue burdens or delay 
on the petitioning tribe. Authorization of inter-governmental compacts 
akin to IGRA may not be needed in all states, but if included as an 
option, it would remove all doubt regarding the possibilities and legality 
of voluntary intergovernmental arrangements. Time for negotiations 
allows consideration of reliance interests, which are established by the 
manner in which law enforcement and service delivery is now carried 
out by tribal, state and federal authorities. Moreover, the sheer 
complexity of the P.L. 280 jurisdictional scheme counsels in favor of a 
deliberate process in which the affected governments can assess the 
effect of retrocession on their resources and constituents. Any new 
retrocession process must be developed in consultation with Indian 
                                                     
270. See text at infra notes 70–71. 
271. Washburn, supra note 37, at 713–15. 
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tribes and affected parties. The purpose of any substantive requirements 
should simply look to an explanation of how retroceded jurisdiction 
would be replaced. We live in the era of tribal self-determination. It is 
time that tribes be given the option to remove that relic of the 
termination era—P.L. 280. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article provides the reader with background information in the 
field of federal Indian law and explains the complexities of criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian country. It demonstrates that the independence of 
the Indian tribes at the time of the United States’ formation was well 
accepted, and treaty making with the tribes was consistent with their 
quasi-independent status after their involuntary incorporation into the 
United States. The immunity of Indian tribes and their members from 
state jurisdiction has a pedigree stretching back to the adoption of the 
Constitution. P.L. 280 altered that situation in a dramatic way by 
granting states jurisdiction without following the democratic consent 
principle. As Senator Jackson noted in 1975, “[t]he Public Law 280 
legislation was approved by Congress in the face of strenuous Indian 
opposition and denied consent of the Indian tribes affected by the 
Act . . . . The Indian community viewed the passage of Public Law 280 
as an added dimension to the dreaded termination policy.”272  
The complexity that resulted from the ill-conceived grant of authority 
to the states by P.L. 280 actually decreased the effectiveness of law 
enforcement in Indian country. The federal government repudiated 
termination in 1970 in favor of the policy of tribal self-determination, 
which continues, but P.L. 280’s intrusion into Indian country remains. 
Washington State assumed P.L. 280 jurisdiction in an extremely 
complex fashion and generally without the consent of Indian tribes. The 
denial of tribal consent to the jurisdictional scheme on both the federal 
and state levels is inconsistent with the notion that the consent of the 
people is a bedrock principle of democracy in the United States. 
The Article goes on to describe how Washington developed a state 
retrocession statute that provides tribes with an innovative avenue to 
remove unwanted state jurisdiction. Washington’s P.L. 280 retrocession 
law marks a progressive step toward recognizing tribal sovereignty and 
self-determination, but it does not go far enough because it still denies 
tribes the power to remove jurisdiction asserted unilaterally. Congress 
                                                     
272. S. COMM. ON THE INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., BACKGROUND REP. ON 
PUBLIC LAW 280 (Comm. Print 1975) (statement of Sen. Henry M. Jackson, Chairman). 
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should consider and pass legislation authorizing tribes to remove state 
jurisdiction obtained under P.L. 280. Models that vest that power in the 
tribes, but include opportunities for negotiated cooperative schemes, are 
set out in the final section of the Article. Such approaches allow Indian 
tribes the opportunity to develop arrangements that best promote 
effective justice services and law enforcement in their jurisdictions. 
